University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Finance Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

2011

Tractability in Incentive Contracting
Alex Edmans
University of Pennsylvania

Xavier Gabaix

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers
Part of the Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Edmans, A., & Gabaix, X. (2011). Tractability in Incentive Contracting. Review of Financial Studies, 24 (9),
2865-2894. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr044

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/334
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Tractability in Incentive Contracting
Abstract
This article develops a framework that delivers tractable (i.e., closed-form) optimal contracts, with few
restrictions on the utility function, cost of effort, or noise distribution. By modeling the noise before the
action in each period, we force the contract to provide correct incentives state-by-state, rather than merely
on average. This tightly constrains the set of admissible contracts and allows for a simple solution to the
contracting problem. Our results continue to hold in continuous time, where noise and actions are
simultaneous. We illustrate the potential usefulness of our setup by a series of examples related to CEO
incentives. In particular, the model derives predictions for the optimal measure of incentives and whether
the contract should be convex, concave, or linear.

Disciplines
Finance | Finance and Financial Management

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/334

Tractability in Incentive Contracting∗
Alex Edmans
Wharton

Xavier Gabaix
NYU Stern, CEPR and NBER
March 22, 2010

Abstract
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal
contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action
in each period, we force the contract to provide correct incentives state-by-state, rather
than merely on average. This tightly constrains the set of admissible contracts and allows
for a simple solution to the contracting problem. Our results continue to hold in continuous
time, where noise and actions are simultaneous. We thus extend the tractable contracts
of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to settings that do not require exponential utility, a
pecuniary cost of eﬀort, Gaussian noise or continuous time. The contract’s functional
form is independent of the noise distribution. Moreover, if the cost of eﬀort is pecuniary
(multiplicative), the contract is linear (log-linear) in output and its slope is independent
of the noise distribution, utility function and reservation utility.
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Introduction

The principal-agent problem is central to many economic settings, such as employment contracts, insurance, taxation and regulation. A vast literature analyzing this problem has found
that it is typically diﬃcult to solve: even in simple settings, the optimal contract can be highly
complex (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1983)). The first-order approach is often invalid, requiring the use of more intricate techniques. Even if an optimal contract can be derived, it
is often not attainable in closed form, which reduces tractability — a particularly important
feature in applied theory models.
Against this backdrop, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, “HM”) made a major breakthrough
by showing that the optimal contract is linear in profits under certain conditions. Their result
has since been widely used by applied theorists to justify assuming a linear contract, which
leads to substantial tractability. However, HM emphasized that their result only holds under
exponential utility, a pecuniary cost of eﬀort, Gaussian noise, and continuous time. These
assumptions may not hold in a number of situations — for example, there is ample evidence of
decreasing absolute risk aversion, and many eﬀort decisions do not involve a monetary expenditure (e.g. exerting eﬀort rather than shirking, or forgoing private benefits). In addition, in
certain settings, the modeler may wish to use discrete time or binary noise for simplicity.
This paper develops a broad class of setting in which simple contracts can be obtained
without the above restrictions. We consider a discrete-time, multiperiod model where the agent
consumes only in the final period. We first solve for the cheapest contract that implements a
given (but possibly time-varying) path of target eﬀort levels. The optimal incentive scheme is
tractable, i.e. attainable in closed form. The key source of tractability is our timing assumption
that, in each period, the agent first observes noise and then exerts eﬀort, before observing the
noise in the next period. This is similar to theories in which the agent observes total cash flow
before deciding how much to divert (e.g. Lacker and Weinberg (1989), DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and Biais et al. (2007)). Since the agent knows the
noise realization when taking his action, incentive compatibility requires the agent’s marginal
incentives to be correct state-by-state (i.e. for every possible noise outcome), which tightly
constrains the set of admissible contracts. By contrast, if the action were taken before the
noise, incentive compatibility would only pin down marginal incentives on average. There are
many possible contracts that induce incentive compatibility on average, and the problem is
complex as the principal must solve for the cheapest contract out of this continuum. Note that
the timing assumption does not change the fact that the agent faces uncertainty when deciding
his eﬀort level since each action, except the final one, continues to be followed by noise. Even
in a one-period model, the agent faces risk after signing the contract.
The analysis also demonstrates what features of the environment do and do not matter
for the optimal implementation contract. The contract’s functional form is independent of the
agent’s noise distribution and reservation utility, i.e. it can be written without reference to
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these parameters. The functional form depends only on how the agent trades oﬀ the benefits of
cash against the cost of providing eﬀort. Moreover, the contract’s slope, as well as its functional
form, is independent of the agent’s utility function, reservation utility and noise distribution in
two cases. First, if the cost of eﬀort is pecuniary as in HM (i.e. can be expressed as a subtraction
to cash pay), the incentive scheme is linear in output regardless of these parameters, even if the
cost of eﬀort is itself non-linear. Second, if the agent’s preferences are multiplicative in cash
and eﬀort, the contract is independent of utility and log-linear, i.e. the percentage change in
pay is linear in output. This robustness contrasts with many classical principal-agent models
(e.g. Grossman and Hart (1983)), where even the implementation contract is contingent upon
many specific features of the contracting situation. This poses practical diﬃculties, as some of
the important determinants are diﬃcult for the principal to observe and thus use to guide the
contract, such as the noise distribution and agent’s utility function. Our results suggest that,
under some specifications, the implementation contract is robust to such parametric uncertainty.
Closed-form solutions allow the economic implications of a contract to be transparent. We
consider a application to CEO incentives to demonstrate the implications that can flow from
a tractable contract structure. For CEOs, the appropriate output measure is the percentage
stock return, and multiplicative preferences are theoretically motivated by Edmans, Gabaix and
Landier (2009). The percentage change in pay is thus linear in the percentage change in firm
value, i.e. the relevant measure of incentives is the elasticity of pay with respect to firm value.
This analysis provides a theoretical justification for using elasticities to measure incentives, a
metric previously advocated by Murphy (1999) on empirical grounds.
The above results are derived under a general contracting framework, where the contract
may depend on messages sent by the agent to the principal, and also be stochastic. Using recent
advances in continuous-time contracting (Sannikov (2008)), we then show that the contract
retains the same form in a continuous-time model where noise and eﬀort occur simultaneously.
This consistency suggests that, if underlying reality is continuous time, it is best approximated
in discrete time by modeling noise before eﬀort in each period.
We next allow the target eﬀort level to depend on the current-period noise, similar to papers
in which the agent observes the state of nature before choosing his action (e.g. Harris and
Raviv (1979), Sappington (1983), Baker (1992), and Prendergast (2002).) The principal now
implements an “action function” which specifies a diﬀerent action for each noise realization. We
identify the class of feasible action functions, providing a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
a given action function to be implementable. The optimal contract now depends on messages
sent by the agent regarding the noise, but remains tractable.
Jointly deriving the optimal eﬀort level in addition to the eﬃcient contract that implements
it can be highly complex. Thus, many contracting papers focus exclusively (e.g. Dittmann and
Maug (2007) and Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2009)) or predominantly (e.g. Grossman and Hart
(1983), Lacker and Weinberg (1989), Biais et al. (2010), He (2009a, 2009b)) on implementing a
fixed target eﬀort level. The analysis described thus far follows this approach. We then derive
3

a suﬃcient condition under which the full contracting problem — the optimal action function in
addition to its implementation — can be exactly solved; it involves implementing the maximum
productive eﬀort level for all noise realizations. The eﬃcient action is the result of a trade-oﬀ
between the benefits of eﬀort (which are increasing in firm size) and its costs (direct disutility
plus the risk imposed by incentives, which are of similar order of magnitude to the agent’s
wage). We show that, if the output under the agent’s control is suﬃciently large compared
to the disutility of eﬀort, risk aversion and noise dispersion (e.g. the agent is a CEO who
aﬀects total firm value), these trade-oﬀ considerations disappear: the benefits of eﬀort swamp
the costs. Thus, maximum eﬀort is optimal, regardless of the noise outcome. We caveat that
the suﬃcient condition may not be satisfied in all settings, for instance where the agent is a
rank-and-file employee with limited eﬀect on output. However, when applicable, the “maximum
eﬀort principle”1 significantly increases tractability, since it removes the need to solve the tradeoﬀ required to derive the optimal eﬀort level when it is interior, and thus is useful for practical
applications. The analysis also demonstrates the conditions under which it is justifiable for
researchers to focus on a fixed eﬀort level, for instance in the theoretical models cited above or
in calibrating data to a given eﬀort level (e.g. Dittmann and Maug (2007), Dittmann, Maug
and Spalt (2009).)
Finally, we allow the principal to choose the maximum productive eﬀort level depending on
the costs and benefits of the environment. We extend the model to a two-stage game. In the
first stage, the principal chooses the maximum productive eﬀort level, e.g. by selecting the size
of the plant. In the second stage, the contract is played out as before — the principal wishes
the agent to run the plant (whatever its size) with maximum eﬃciency. As in standard models,
the eﬀort level set in the first stage is typically decreasing in the agent’s risk aversion, cost
of eﬀort and noise dispersion. Thus, the two-stage game allows for contracts that are simple
(since the maximum eﬀort principle applies in the second stage and so solving for a trade-oﬀ is
not required) yet still respond to the costs and benefits of the environment and thus generate
comparative static predictions.
In sum, our analysis generates a set of suﬃcient conditions to obtain tractable contracts. For
the implementation contract to be tractable, modeling the action after the noise is suﬃcient; for
the full contract that also solves for the optimal eﬀort level, ex-post actions plus a high benefit
of eﬀort are suﬃcient — in turn, large firm size is suﬃcient (although not necessary) for the
latter. These suﬃcient conditions are quite diﬀerent from the HM assumptions of exponential
utility, a pecuniary cost of eﬀort, Gaussian noise, and continuous time, and so may be satisfied
in many settings in which the HM assumptions do not hold and tractability was previously
believed to be unattainable.
We achieve simple contracts in other settings than HM due to a diﬀerent modeling setup.
In a dynamic setting, high prior period outcomes increase the agent’s wealth and distort the
1

We allow for the agent to exert eﬀort that does not benefit the principal. The “maximum eﬀort principle”
refers to the maximum productive eﬀort that the agent can undertake to benefit the principal.
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current period decision through two “wealth eﬀects.” First, higher wealth aﬀects the agent’s
current risk aversion and thus eﬀort choice. HM assume exponential utility to remove this
eﬀect. Second, higher wealth reduces the agent’s marginal utility of money; if the marginal cost
of eﬀort is unchanged, the agent has fewer incentives to exert eﬀort. This problem occurs with
any risk-averse utility function, including exponential utility. HM assume that the cost of eﬀort
is pecuniary, so that it also declines when wealth increases. HM require these two assumptions
to remove the intertemporal link between periods and allow the multiperiod problem to collapse
into a succession of identical static problems. Even the single-period problem remains potentially complex, since many contracts satisfy the incentive compatibility condition on average.
HM address this by giving the agent substantial freedom — rather than simply selecting the
mean return of the firm, he has control over the probabilities of  diﬀerent states of nature.2
This freedom simplifies the contracting problem by reducing the set of allowable contracts.
However, this formulation is more cumbersome since eﬀort is the choice of a probability vector,
and is thus relatively seldom used in applied theory models.
We model eﬀort as a scalar that aﬀects the firm’s mean return, because this formulation
is most commonly used in theoretical applications owing to its simplicity. We instead give the
agent freedom by specifying the noise before the action — a choice that is not possible when
eﬀort involves the selection of probabilities, since noise unavoidably follows the action. In
addition to achieving tractability by forcing the contract to hold state-by-state, the timing
assumption also removes the need for exponential utility by allowing the multiperiod model to
be solved by backward induction, so that it becomes a succession of single-period problems.
In the single-period problem, the noise is observed before the action — thus, the agent’s risk
aversion is unimportant and exponential utility is not required. A potential intertemporal link
remains since high past outcomes, or high current noise, mean that the agent already expects
high consumption and thus has a lower incentive to exert eﬀort, if he exhibits diminishing
marginal utility. This issue is present in the Mirrlees (1974) contract if the agent can observe
past outcomes. Put diﬀerently, in the single-period problem, the agent does not face risk (as
the noise is known) but faces distortion (as the noise aﬀects his eﬀort incentives). The optimal
contract must address these issues: if the utility function is concave, the contract is convex
so that, at high levels of consumption, the agent is awarded a greater number of dollars for
exerting eﬀort, to oﬀset the lower marginal utility of each additional dollar. Allowing for convex
contracts also allows us to drop the second critical assumption of a pecuniary cost of eﬀort.
Even if high wealth reduces the marginal utility of cash but not the marginal cost of eﬀort,
incentives are preserved because the contract is steeper at high wealth levels.
In addition to its results, the paper’s proofs import and extend some mathematical techniques that are relatively rare in economics and may be of use in future models. We use the
subderivative, a generalization of the derivative that allows for quasi first-order conditions even
2

This specification refers to the discrete-time version of the HM model, as this is most comparable to our
setting. In that version, the contract is linear in accounts, although not linear in profits.
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if the objective function is not everywhere diﬀerentiable. This concept is related to Krishna
and Maenner’s (2001) use of the subgradient, although the applications are quite diﬀerent. It
allows us to avoid the first-order approach, and so may be useful for models where suﬃcient
conditions for the first-order approach cannot be verified.3 We also use the notion of “relative
dispersion” to prove that the incentive compatibility constraints bind, i.e. the principal imposes
the minimum slope that induces eﬀort. We show that the binding contract is less dispersed
than alternative solutions, constituting eﬃcient risk sharing. A similar argument rules out stochastic contracts, where the payout is a random function of output.4 We extend a result from
Landsberger and Meilijson (1994), who use relative dispersion in another economic setting.
This paper builds on a rich literature on tractable multiperiod agency problems. HM show
the optimal contract is linear in profits under exponential utility and a pecuniary cost of eﬀort, if
the agent controls only the drift of the process and time is continuous; they show that this result
does not hold in discrete time. A number of papers extend their result to more general settings,
although all continue to require exponential utility and a pecuniary cost of eﬀort. In Sung (1995)
and Ou-Yang (2003), the agent also controls the diﬀusion of the process in continuous time.
Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) achieve linearity in discrete time, under the additional assumptions
that the agent can destroy profits before reporting them to the principal, and that the principal
can only observe output in the final period. Our setting allows the principal to observe signals
in each period. Mueller (2000) shows that linear contracts are not optimal in HM if the agent
can only change the drift at discrete points, even if these points are numerous and so the model
closely approximates continuous time.
Our modeling of noise before the action is most similar to models in which the agent can
observe total cash flow before deciding how much to divert. Lacker and Weinberg (1989) show
that the optimal contract to deter all diversion (the analog of maximum eﬀort) is piecewise
linear, regardless of the noise distribution and utility function. Their core result is similar to
a specific case of our Theorem 1, restricted to a pecuniary cost of eﬀort and a single period.
In DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and Biais et al. (2007), the
optimal contract is linear because the agent is risk-neutral — therefore, there is no issue with
wealth aﬀecting risk aversion (which is always zero) nor the marginal benefit of diversion (which
is constant for each dollar diverted). The risk-neutral version of Garrett and Pavan (2009) also
predicts linear contracts. Our setting considers risk aversion, where high past output reduces
the marginal benefit of eﬀort, thus requiring a convex contract to preserve incentives.
3

See Rogerson (1985) for suﬃcient conditions for the first-order approach to be valid under a single signal,
and Jewitt (1988) for situations in which the principal can observe multiple signals. Schaettler and Sung (1993)
derive suﬃcient conditions for the first-order approach to be valid in a large class of principal-agent problems,
of which HM is a special case.
4
With separable utility, it is simple to show that the constraints bind: the principal oﬀers the least risky
contract that achieves incentive compatibility. With non-separable utility, introducing additional randomization
by giving the agent a riskier contract than necessary may be desirable (Arnott and Stiglitz (1988)) — an example
of the theory of second best. We use the concept of relative dispersion to prove that constraints bind.
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This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we derive tractable contracts, starting with a
constant implemented action (in both discrete and continuous time) and then allowing the target
action to depend on the realized noise. Section 3 derives a condition under which maximum
productive eﬀort is optimal for all noise outcomes, and allows the principal to determine this
maximum according to the environment. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs
and other additional materials; further peripheral material is in the Online Appendix.

2

The Core Model

2.1

Discrete Time

We consider a  -period model; its key parameters are summarized in Table 1. In each period
, the agent observes noise  , takes an unobservable action  , and then observes the noise in
period  + 1. The action  is broadly defined to encompass any decision that benefits output
but is personally costly to the principal. Examples include eﬀort (low  represents shirking),
project choice (low  involves selecting projects that maximize private benefits rather than firm
value), or rent extraction (low  reflects cash flow diversion.) We assume that noises 1   
are independent with interval support with interior (   ), where the bounds may be infinite,
and that 2    have log-concave densities.5 We require no other distributional assumption
for  ; in particular, it need not be Gaussian. The action space A has interval support, bounded
below and above by  and . We allow for both open and closed action sets and for the bounds
to be infinite. After the action is taken, a verifiable signal
 =  + 

(1)

is publicly observed at the end of each period .
Insert Table 1 about here
Our assumption that  precedes  is featured in models in which the agent sees total output
before deciding how much to divert (e.g. Lacker and Weinberg (1989), DeMarzo and Fishman
(2007), Biais et al. (2007)), or observes the “state of nature” before choosing eﬀort (e.g. Harris
and Raviv (1979), Sappington (1983), Baker (1992), and Prendergast (2002)6 ). Note that this
timing assumption does not make the agent immune to risk — in every period, except the final
5

A random variable is log-concave if it has a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure, and the log of
this density is a concave function. Many standard density functions are log-concave, in particular the Gaussian,
uniform, exponential, Laplace, Dirichlet, Weibull, and beta distributions (see, e.g., Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991)).
On the other hand, most fat-tailed distributions are not log-concave, such as the Pareto distribution.
6
In such papers, the optimal action typically depends on the state of nature. We allow for such dependence
in Section 2.3.
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one, his action is followed by noise. Even in a one-period model, the agent bears risk as the
noise is unknown when he signs the contract. In Section 2.2 we show that the contract has the
same functional form in continuous time, where  and  are simultaneous. While the timing
assumption extends the model’s applicability to a cash flow diversion setting (an application
that is not possible if noise follows the action), a limitation is that  cannot be interpreted as
measurement error.
In period  , the principal pays the agent cash of .7 The agent’s utility function is
" Ã

E   () −


X
=1

!#

 ( )



(2)

 represents the cost of eﬀort, which is increasing and weakly convex.  is the utility function
and  is the felicity8 function which denotes the agent’s utility from cash; both are increasing
and weakly concave. ,  and  are all twice continuously diﬀerentiable. We specify functions
for both utility and felicity to maximize the generality of the setup. For example, the util¡
¢1−
ity function −()
 (1 − ) is commonly used in macroeconomics (see e.g. Cooley and
Prescott (1995)), which entails  () = (1−)  (1 − ) 9 and  () = ln . The case () = 
denotes additively separable preferences; () = ln  generates multiplicative preferences. If
() = , the cost of eﬀort is expressed as a subtraction to cash pay. This is appropriate
if eﬀort represents an opportunity cost of foregoing an alternative income-generating activity
(e.g. outside consulting), or involves a financial expenditure. HM assume () = −− and
() = .
The only assumption that we make for the utility function  is that it exhibits nonincreasing
absolute risk aversion (NIARA), i.e. −00 () 0 () is nonincreasing in . Most common utility
functions (e.g. constant absolute risk aversion  () = −− and constant relative risk aversion
 () = 1−  (1 − ),   0) exhibit NIARA. This assumption turns out to be suﬃcient to
rule out randomized contracts.
The agent’s reservation utility is given by  ∈ Im , where Im  is the image of , i.e. the
range of values taken by . We assume that Im  = R so that we can apply the −1 function to
any real number.10 We take an optimal contracting approach that imposes no restrictions on
the contracting space available to the principal, so the contract e
(·) can be stochastic, nonlinear
in the signals  , and depend on messages  sent by the agent. By the revelation principle,
we can assume that the the space of messages  is R and that the principal wishes to induce
7

If the agent quits before time  , he receives a very low wage .
We note that the term “felicity” is typically used to denote one-period utility in an intertemporal model.
We use it in a non-standard manner here to distinguish it from the utility function .
9
The specification typically involves   1 so that  is concave; when  = 1, the limit is understood as
 () = .
10
This assumption could be weakened. With  defined as in Theorem 1, it is suﬃcient to assume that there
exists a value of  which makes the participation constraint
a “threat¡consumption”
which deters
¢
Pbind, andP
the agent from exerting very low eﬀort, i.e. inf   () − inf    ( ) ≤   0 (∗ )  + ∗ + .
8
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truth-telling by the agent. The full timing is as follows:
1. The principal proposes a (possibly stochastic) contract e
 (1     1    ) 

2. The agent agrees to the contract or receives his reservation utility .

3. The agent observes noise 1 , sends the principal a message 1 , then exerts eﬀort 1 
4. The signal 1 = 1 + 1 is publicly observed.
5. Steps (3)-(4) are repeated for  = 2   .
6. The principal pays the agent e
 (1     1    ).

Throughout most of the paper, we abstract from imperfect commitment problems and focus
on a single source of market imperfection: moral hazard. This assumption is common in the
dynamic moral hazard literature: see, e.g., Rogerson (1985), HM, Spear and Srivastava (1987),
Phelan and Townsend (1991), Biais et al. (2007, 2010). The Online Appendix extends the
model to accommodate quits and firings.
As in the first stage of Grossman and Hart (1983), for now we fix the path of eﬀort levels
that the principal wants to implement at (∗ )=1 , where ∗   and ∗ may be time-varying.11
In Section 2.3 we allow for the target action to depend on the noise realization. An admissible
contract gives the agent an expected utility of at least  and induces him to take path (∗ ) and
truthfully report noises ( )=1 . The principal is risk-neutral, and so the optimal contract is
the admissible contract with the lowest expected cost E [e
].
We now formally define the principal’s program. Let F be the filtration induced by
(1    ), the noise revealed up to time . The agent’s policy is ( ) = (1     1    ),
where  and  are F −measurable.  is the eﬀort taken by the agent if noise (1    ) has
been realized, and  is a message sent by the agent upon observing (1    ). Let  denote the space of such policies, and ∆ () the set of randomized policies. Define (∗   ∗ ) =
(∗1   ∗  1∗   ∗ ) as the policy of exerting eﬀort ∗ at time  and sending the truthful
message ∗ (1    ) =  . The program is given below:
Program 1 The principal chooses a contract e
 (1     1    ) and a F −measurable
∗
message policy ( )=1 , that minimizes expected cost:
min E [e
 (∗1 + 1   ∗ +   1∗   ∗ )] 
11


(·)

If ∗ = , then a flat wage induces the optimal action.

9

(3)

subject to the following constraints:
IC: (∗  ∗ )=1 ∈ arg

max

()∈∆()

" Ã

E   (e
 (1 + 1    +   1    )) −

" Ã

IR: E   (e
 (·)) −


X

!#

 (∗ )

=1


X

!#

 ( )

=1

(4)

≥ 

(5)

If the analysis is restricted to message-free contracts, (4) implies that the time- action ∗
is given by:
" Ã

∀1     ∗ ∈ arg max E   (e
 (∗1 + 1    +    ∗ +  )) −  ( ) −



X

=16=

!

 (∗ )

| 1    

(6)

12

Theorem 1 below describes our solution to Program 1.

Theorem 1 (Optimal contract, discrete time). The following contract is optimal. The agent
is paid
Ã 
!
X
−1
0
∗
 ( )  +  ,
(7)
=
=1

!#
" Ã P
0
∗

(
)

+


=
where  is a constant that makes the participation constraint bind (E 
P
 −   (∗ )
). The functional form (7) is independent of the utility function , the reservation utility ,
and the distribution of the noise ; these parameters aﬀect only the scalar . The optimal
contract is deterministic and does not require messages.
In particular, if the target action is time-independent (∗ = ∗ ∀ ), the contract
 =  −1 (0 (∗ )  + )
is optimal, where  =

P

=1 

(8)

is the total signal.

Proof. (Heuristic). The Appendix presents a rigorous proof that rules out stochastic contracts
and messages, and does not assume that the contract is diﬀerentiable. Here, we give a heuristic
proof by induction on  that conveys the essence of the result for deterministic message-free
contracts, using first-order conditions and assuming ∗  . We commence with  = 1. Since
12

Theorem 1 characterizes a contract that is optimal, i.e. solves Program 1. Strictly speaking, there exist
other optimal contracts which pay the same as (7) on the equilibrium path, but take diﬀerent values for returns
that are not observed on the equilibrium path. Note that the contract in Theorem 1 allows  to be negative.
Limited liability could be incorporated, at the cost of additional notational complexity, by imposing a lower
bound on  or adding a fixed constant to the signal.
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#

1 is known, we can remove the expectations operator from the IC condition (6). Since  is an
increasing function, it also drops out to yield:
∗1 ∈ arg max  ( (1 + 1 )) −  (1 ) 

(9)

0 ( (∗1 + 1 )) 0 (∗1 + 1 ) −  0 (∗1 ) = 0

(10)

1

The first-order condition is:

Therefore, for all 1 ,
 0 ( (1 )) 0 (1 ) = 0 (∗1 ) 
which integrates over 1 to
 ( (1 )) =  0 (∗1 ) 1 + 

(11)

for some constant
. Contract
´ (11) must hold for all 1 that occurs with non-zero probability,
³
∗
∗
i.e. for 1 ∈ 1 + 1  1 +  1 .
We will proceed now by induction on the total number of periods  : we now show that, if
the result holds for  , it also holds for  + 1. Let  (1    +1 ) ≡  ( (1    +1 )) denote the
indirect felicity function, i.e. the contract in terms of felicity rather than cash. At  =  + 1,
the IC condition is:
∗ +1

∈ arg max  (1      +1 +  +1 ) −  ( +1 ) −
 +1


X

 (∗ ) 

(12)

=1

Applying the result for  = 1, to induce ∗ +1 at  + 1, the contract must be of the form:
¡
¢
 (1      +1 ) =  0 ∗ +1  +1 +  (1    ) 

(13)

where the integration “constant” now depends on the past signals, i.e.  (1    ). In turn,
 (1    ) is chosen to implement ∗1   ∗ viewed from  = 0, when the agent’s utility is:
" Ã

!#

X
¡
¡
¢
¢
   (1    ) + 0 ∗ +1  +1 −  ∗ +1 −
 ( )

Defining

=1

£ ¡
¡
¡
¢
¢¢¤

b () = E   + 0 ∗ +1  +1 −  ∗ +1


(14)

the principal’s problem is to implement ∗1   ∗ with a contract  (1    ), given a utility
function
" Ã
!#

X
 
b  (1    ) −
 ( )

=1
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Applying the result for  , the contract must have the form  (1    ) =
for some constant . Combining this with (11), the contract must satisfy:
 (1      +1 ) =

 +1
X

0 (∗ )  + 

P

=1

 0 (∗ )  + 

(15)

=1

 ³
´
Y
for ( ) that occurs with non-zero probability (i.e. (1    ) ∈
∗ +    ∗ +  . The
=1
´
³P
 +1 0
−1
∗
associated pay is  = 
=1  ( )  +  , as in (7). Conversely, any contract that
satisfies (15) is incentive compatible.
Theorem 1 yields a closed-form contract for any  and (∗ ). The Theorem also clarifies
the parameters that do and do not matter for the contract’s functional form. It depends only
on the felicity function  and the cost of eﬀort , i.e. how the agent trades oﬀ the benefits
of cash against the costs of providing eﬀort, and is independent of the utility function , the
reservation utility , and the distribution of the noise . Even though these parameters do not
aﬀect the contract’s functional form, in general they will aﬀect its slope via their impact on
the scalar . However, if () =  (the cost of eﬀort is pecuniary) as assumed by HM, the
contract’s slope is also independent of ,  and : it is linear, regardless of these parameters.
The linear contracts of HM can thus be achieved in settings that do not require exponential
utility, Gaussian noise or continuous time. Note that, even if the cost of eﬀort is pecuniary, it
remains a general, possibly non-linear function  ( ).
The origins of the contract’s tractability can be seen in the heuristic proof. We first consider
 = 1. Since 1 is known, the expectations operator can be removed from (6).  then drops out
to yield (9). The specific form of  is irrelevant — all that matters is that it is monotonic, and so
it is maximized by maximizing its argument. In particular, exponential utility is not required
— the agent’s attitude to risk does not matter as 1 is known. In turn, (9) yields the first-order
condition (10), which must hold for every possible realization of 1 , i.e. state-by-state. This
pins down the slope of the contract: for all 1 , the agent must receive a marginal felicity of
 0 (∗1 ) for a one unit increment to the signal 1 . The principal’s only degree of freedom is the
constant , which is itself pinned down by the participation constraint.
By contrast, if 1 followed the action, and assuming linear  for simplicity, (10) would be

 [0 ( (1 )) 0 (1 )] = 0 (∗1 ) 

(16)

This first-order condition only determines the agent’s marginal incentives on average, rather
than state-by-state. There are multiple contracts that will satisfy (10) and implement ∗1 , and
the problem is significantly more complex as the principal must solve for the cheapest contract
out of this continuum. By giving the agent greater flexibility in the action space (by allowing
him to respond to 1 ), our timing assumption simplifies the contracting problem by tightly
12

constraining the set of incentive compatible contracts. This is similar to the intuition behind
the linear contracts of HM, who give the agent flexibility by granting him control over not just
the mean signal, but the probability of each realization. Equation (8) shows that, if the target
action (and thus marginal cost of eﬀort) is constant, incentives must be constant time-by-time
P
as well as state-by-state, and so only aggregate performance ( = =1  ) matters.
Even though all noise is known when the agent takes his action, it is not automatically
irrelevant. First, since the agent does not know 1 when he signs the contract, he is subject
to risk and so the first-best is not achieved. Second, the noise realization has the potential
to undo incentives. If 1 is high, 1 and thus  will already be high; a high  has the same
eﬀect. If the agent exhibits diminishing marginal felicity (i.e.  is concave), he will have lower
incentives to exert eﬀort. Put diﬀerently, at the time the agent takes his action, he does not
face risk (as 1 is known) but faces distortion (as 1 aﬀects his eﬀort incentives). The optimal
contract must address this problem. It does so by being convex, via the −1 transformation: if
noise is high, it gives a greater number of dollars for exerting eﬀort (1 ), to exactly oﬀset
the lower marginal felicity of each dollar (0 ()). Therefore, the marginal felicity from eﬀort
remains 0 ()1 = 0 (∗1 ), and incentives are preserved regardless of  or 1 . If the cost
of eﬀort is pecuniary (() = ),  −1 () =  and so no transformation is needed. Since both
the costs and benefits of eﬀort are in monetary terms, high 1 reduces them equally. Thus,
incentives are unchanged even with a linear contract.
The idea of subjecting the agent to a constant incentive pressure is also similar to HM.
However, in HM, the constant incentive pressure involves giving the agent a constant increase
in cash for an increase in the signal. Here, the agent is given a constant increase in felicity,
0 ( (1 )) 0 (1 ). This generalization allows us to drop the assumption of a pecuniary cost of
eﬀort, in which case the contract is non-linear. In the cash flow diversion models of DeMarzo and
Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and Biais et al. (2007), the optimal contract is
linear because the agent is risk-neutral. His utility rises by a constant amount  for each dollar
diverted, and so the optimal contract must give him a constant share  of output. Lacker and
Weinberg (1989) achieve a (piecewise) linear contract with general utility functions and noise
distributions, under a pecuniary cost of eﬀort and for  = 1. We extend their result to general
 and a non-pecuniary cost of eﬀort.
We now move to   1. In all periods    , the agent is now exposed to risk, since he does
not know future noise realizations when he chooses  . Much like the eﬀect of a high current
noise realization, if the agent expects future noise to be high, his incentives to exert eﬀort will
be reduced. This would typically require the agent to integrate over future noise realizations
when choosing  , leading to high complexity. Here the unknown future noise outcomes do not
matter, as can be seen in the heuristic proof. Before  + 1,  +1 is unknown. However, (13)
shows that the unknown  +1 enters additively and does not aﬀect the incentive constraints
of the  = 1   problems — regardless of what  +1 turns out to be, the contract must give
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the agent a marginal felicity of 0 (∗ ) for exerting eﬀort at .13 Our timing assumption thus
allows us to solve the multiperiod problem via backward induction, reducing it to a succession
of one-period problems, each of which can be solved tractably.
Even though we can consider each problem separately, the periods remain interdependent.
Much like the current noise realization, past outcomes may aﬀect the current eﬀort choice. The
Mirrlees (1974) contract punishes the agent if final output is below a threshold. Therefore, if
the agent can observe past outcomes, he will shirk if interim output is high. This complexity
distinguishes our multiperiod model from a static multi-action model, where the agent chooses
 actions simultaneously. As in HM, and unlike in a multi-action model, here the agent observes
past outcomes when taking his current action, and can vary his action in response. HM assume
exponential utility and a pecuniary cost of eﬀort to remove such “wealth eﬀects” and eliminate
the intertemporal link between periods. We instead ensure that past outcomes do not distort
incentives via the above  −1 transformation, and so do not require either assumption.
The Appendix proves that, even though the agent privately observes  , there is no need for
him to communicate it to the principal. Since ∗ is implemented for all  , there is a one-to-one
correspondence between  and  on the equilibrium path. The principal can thus infer  from
 , rendering messages redundant. The Appendix also rules out randomized contracts. There are
two eﬀects of randomization. First, it leads to ineﬃcient risk-sharing, for any concave . Second,
changing the reward for eﬀort from a certain payment to a lottery may increase or decrease
his eﬀort incentives.14 We show that with NIARA utility, this second eﬀect is negative. Thus,
both eﬀects of randomization are undesirable, and deterministic contracts are unambiguously
optimal. The proof makes use of the independence of noises and the log-concavity of 2    .
While these assumptions, combined with NIARA utility, are suﬃcient to rule out randomized
contracts, they may not be necessary. In future research, it would be interesting to explore
whether randomized contracts can be ruled out in broader settings.15
In addition to allowing for stochastic contracts, the above analysis also allows for ∗ = ,
under which the IC constraint is an inequality. Therefore, the contract in (7) only provides a
lower bound on the contract slope. A sharper-than-necessary contract has a similar eﬀect to
a stochastic contract, since it subjects the agent to additional risk. Again, the combination of
NIARA and independent and log-concave noises is suﬃcient rule out such contracts.
13

This can be most clearly seen in the definition of the new utility function (14), which “absorbs” the  + 1
period problem.
14
See Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) for detail on how randomization can sometimes be desirable — if low effort leads to a random payoﬀ, this may induce the agent to induce eﬀort. They derive suﬃcient conditions
under which randomization is suboptimal. Our conditions to guarantee the suboptimality of random contracts
generalize their results to broader agency problems (their setting focuses on insurance).
15
For instance, consider  = 2. We only require that 
b () as defined in (43) exhibits NIARA. The concavity
of 2 is suﬃcient, but unnecessary for this. Separately, if NIARA is violated, the marginal cost of eﬀort falls with
randomization. However, this eﬀect may be outweighed by the ineﬃcient risk-sharing, so randomized contracts
may still be dominated.
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If the analysis is restricted to deterministic contracts and ∗   ∀ , the contract in (7) is
the only incentive-compatible contract (for the signal values realized on the equilibrium path).
We can thus relax the above three assumptions. This result is stated in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 (Optimal deterministic contract, ∗   ∀ ). Consider only deterministic
contracts and ∗   ∀ . Relax the assumptions of NIARA utility, independent noises, and
log-concave noises for 2    . Any incentive-compatible contract takes the form
 =  −1

Ã 
X

 0 (∗ )  + 

=1

!

(17)



where  is a constant. The optimal deterministic contract features a  that makes the agent’s
participation constraint bind.
Proof. See Appendix.
The following Remark states that the contract’s incentive compatibility is robust to the
timing assumption. In particular, if noise follows the action in each period, the contract in
Theorem 1 continues to implement the target actions — since it provides suﬃcient incentives
state-by-state, it automatically does so on average. However, we can no longer show that it is
optimal, since there are many other contracts that provide suﬃcient incentives on average.
Remark 1 (Robustness of the contract’s incentive compatibility to timing). For any timing
of the noise ( )=1 (i.e. regardless of whether it follows or precedes  in each period), the
contract in Theorem 1 is incentive compatible and implements (∗ )=1 . Indeed, given the
contract, the agent’s utility is:


Ã 
X
=1

0 (∗ ) ( +  ) +  −


X
=1

!

 ( ) 

so that, regardless of the timing of ( )=1 , the agent maximizes his utility by taking action
 = ∗ , as it solves max  0 (∗ )  −  ( ).
Closed-form solutions allow the economic implications of a contract to be transparent. We
close this section by considering two specific applications of Theorem 1 to executive compensation, to highlight the implications that can be gleaned from a tractable contract structure.
While contract (7) can be implemented for any informative signal , the firm’s log equity return
is the natural choice of  for CEOs, since they have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder
value. When the cost of eﬀort is pecuniary ( () = ), Theorem 1 implies that the CEO’s dollar
pay  is linear in the firm’s return . Hence, the relevant incentives measure is the dollar change
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in CEO pay for a given percentage change in firm value (i.e. “dollar-percent” incentives), as
advocated by Hall and Liebman (1998).16
Another common specification is () = ln , in which case the CEO’s utility function (2)
now becomes, up to a monotonic (logarithmic) transformation:
¢¤
£ ¡
E  −() ≥  

(18)

where  () ≡  ( ) and  ≡ ln  is the CEO’s reservation utility. Utility is now multiplicative
in eﬀort and cash; Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009) show that multiplicative preferences
are necessary to generate empirically consistent predictions for the scaling of various measures
of CEO incentives with firm size.17 Thus, the ability to drop the HM assumption of  () = 
becomes valuable. Applying Theorem 1 with  = 1 for simplicity, the optimal contract becomes
ln  =  0 (∗ ) + 

(19)

The contract prescribes the percentage change in CEO pay for a percentage change in firm
value, i.e. “percent-percent” incentives; this slope is independent of the utility function 
and the noise distribution. Murphy (1999) advocated this elasticity measure over alternative
incentive measures (such as “dollar-percent” incentives) on two empirical grounds: it is invariant
to firm size, and firm returns have much greater explanatory power for percentage than dollar
changes in pay. However, he notes that “elasticities have no corresponding agency-theoretic
interpretation.” The above analysis shows that elasticities are the theoretically justified measure
under multiplicative preferences, for any utility function. This result extends Edmans et al. who
advocated “percent-percent” incentives in a risk-neutral, one-period model.

2.2

Continuous Time

This section shows that the contract has the same tractable form in continuous time, where
actions and noise are simultaneous. This consistency suggests that, if reality is continuous time,
it is best approximated in discrete time by modeling noise before eﬀort in each period.
At every instant , the agent takes action  and the principal observes signal  , where
 =

Z



  +  

(20)

0

 =
16

R

  +
0 

R
0

 ,  is a standard Brownian motion, and   0 and  are deterministic.

This incentive measure refers to “ex ante” incentives, i.e. how much the CEO’s pay will change over the
next year if the stock return over the next year increases by one percentage point.
17
Bennardo et al. (2009) show that a multiplicative utility function can justify the use of perks in optimal
compensation.
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The agent’s utility function is:
∙ µ
Z
E   () −

0



¶¸
 ( )  

(21)

The principal observes the path of ( )∈[0 ] and wishes to implement a deterministic action
at each instant. She solves Program 1 with utility function (21). The optimal contract
is of the same tractable form as Theorem 1.
(∗ )∈[0 ]

Theorem 2 (Optimal contract, continuous time). The following contract is optimal. The
agent is paid
µZ 
¶
−1
0
∗
=
 ( )  +  ,
(22)
0

!#
" Ã R
0
∗

(
)

+



0
R
=
where  is a constant that makes the participation constraint bind (E 
− 0  (∗ ) 
).
In particular, if the target action is time-independent (∗ = ∗ ∀ ), the contract
 =  −1 ( 0 (∗ )  + )

(23)

is optimal.
Proof. See Appendix.
To highlight the link with the discrete time case, consider the model of Section 2.1 and
P
P
P
define  = =1  = =1  + =1  . Taking the continuous time limit of Theorem 1 gives
Theorem 2.

2.3

Contingent Target Actions

Thus far, we have considered contracts that implement a fixed eﬀort level, independent of the
realized noise. We now allow for the principal to implement an action that depends on the
current period noise, similar to models in which the agent observes a state of nature before
choosing his action. Suppose the principal now wishes to implement the “action function”
 ( ), which defines the target action for each noise realization. (Thus far, we have assumed
 ( ) = ∗ .) Since diﬀerent noises  may lead to the same observed signal  =  ( ) +  ,
the analysis must consider revelation mechanisms. If the agent announces noises b1   b , he
is paid  =  (b
1   b ) if the observed signals are 1 (b
1 ) + b1    (b
 ) + b , and a very low
amount  otherwise.
As in the core model, we assume that  ( )   ∀  , else a flat contract would be optimal
for some noise realizations. We make three additional technical assumptions: the action space A
is open,  ( ) is bounded within any compact subinterval of , and  ( ) is almost everywhere
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continuous. The final assumption still allows for a countable number of jumps in  ( ). Given
the complexity and length of the proof that randomized contracts are inferior in Theorem 1,
we now restrict the analysis to deterministic contracts and assume  ( )  . We conjecture
that the same arguments in that proof continue to apply with a noise-dependent target action.
The optimal contract induces both the target eﬀort level ( =  ( )) and truth-telling
(b
 =  ). It is given by the next Proposition:
Proposition 2 (Optimal contract, noise-dependent action). A series of contingent action
( ( ))=1 can be implemented if and only if for all ,  ( ) +  is nondecreasing in  . If
that condition is satisfied, the following contract is optimal. For each , after noise  is realized,
 ) + b
the agent communicates a value b to the principal. If the subsequent signal is not  (b
in each period, he is paid a very low amount . Otherwise he is paid  (b
1   b ), where
 (1    ) = 

−1

Ã 
X

 ( ( )) +

=1

 Z
X
=1



0

 ( ())  + 

∗

!



(24)

∗ his an
constant, and 
´iis a constant that makes the participation constraint bind
³Parbitrary
 R  0
= .)
(E 
=1 ∗  ( ())  + 

Proof. (Heuristic). The Appendix presents a rigorous proof that does not assume diﬀerentiability of  and . Here, we give a heuristic proof that conveys the essence of the result using
first-order conditions. We set  = 1 and drop the time subscript.
Instead of reporting , the agent could report b 6= , in which case he receives  unless
 =  (b
 )+b
 . Therefore, he must take action  such that + = b+ (b
), i.e.  =  (b
)+b
 −.
In this case, his utility is  (b
 ) −  ( (b
) + b − ). The truth-telling constraint is thus:

The first-order condition is

) −  ( (b
 ) + b − ) 
 ∈ arg max  (b


 0 () =  0 ( ()) 0 () + 0 ( ()) 
Integrating over  gives the indirect felicity function
 () =  ( ()) +

Z



 0 ( ())  + 

∗

for constants ∗ and . The associated pay is given by (24).
The contract in Proposition 2 remains in closed form and its functional form does not depend
on ,  nor the distribution of .18 However, it is somewhat more complex than the contracts
18

Even though (24) features an integral over the support of , it does not involve the distribution of .
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in Section 2, as it involves calculating an integral. In the particular case where  () = ∗ ∀ ,
Proposition 2 reduces to Theorem 1.
Proposition 2 also identifies the class of action functions that is implementable. An action
function is implementable if and only if  ( ) +  is nondecreasing in  . If this condition is
not satisfied, and a higher noise corresponds to a significantly lower action, the agent would
over-report the noise and exert less eﬀort.
Remark 2 (Extension of Proposition 2 to general signals). Suppose the signal is a general
function  =  (   ), where  is diﬀerentiable and has positive derivatives in both arguments,
1 ( ) 2 ( ) is nondecreasing in , and  ( ( )   ) is nondecreasing in  . The same
analysis as in Proposition 2 derives the following contract as optimal:
 (1    ) = 

−1

Ã 
X
=1

 ( ()) +

Z



∗

2 ( ()  )
 + 
 ( ())
1 ( ()  )
0

!



(25)

where ∗ is an arbitrary constant and  is a constant that makes the participation constraint
bind.
The heuristic proof is as follows (setting  = 1 and dropping the time subscript). If
 is observed and the agent reports b 6= , he has to take action  such that  ( ) =
 ( (b
)  b). Taking the derivative at b =  yields 1 b
 = 1 0 () + 2 . The agent solves
max  (b
 ) −  ( (b
)), with first-order condition  0 () −  0 ( ()) b
 = 0. Substituting for
b
 from above and integrating over  yields (25).

2.4

Discussion: What is Necessary for Tractable Contracts?

The framework considered thus far shows that tractable implementation contracts can be
achieved without requiring exponential utility, a pecuniary cost of eﬀort, continuous time or
Gaussian noise. However, it has still imposed a number of restrictions. We now discuss the
features that are essential for our contract structure, inessential features that we have already
relaxed in extensions, and additional assumptions which may be relaxable in future research.
1. Timing of noise. This assumption is central to the intuition of attaining simple contracts
as it restricts the principal’s flexibility. Remark 1 states that, if  precedes  , contract
(7) still implements (∗ )=1 . However, we can no longer show that it is optimal.
2. Risk-neutral principal. The full proof of Theorem 1 extends the model to the case of a riskaverse principal. If the principal wishes to minimize E [ ()] (where  is an increasing
P
function) rather than E [], then contract (7) is optimal if  ( (−1 (·)) −   (∗ )) is
concave. This holds if, loosely speaking, the principal is not too risk-averse.
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3. NIARA utility, independent and log-concave noise. Proposition 1 states that, if ∗  
∀  and deterministic contracts are assumed, (7) is the only incentive-compatible contract. Therefore, these assumptions are not required. Allowing for ∗ =  and stochastic
contracts, these assumptions are suﬃcient but may not be necessary.
4. Unidimensional noise and action. Appendix D shows that our model is readily extendable
to settings where the action  and the noise  are multidimensional. A close analog to
our result obtains.
5. Linear signal,  =  +  . Remark 2 in Section 2.3 shows that with general signals
 =  (   ), the optimal contract remains tractable and its functional form remains
independent of ,  and the distribution of .
6. Timing of consumption. The current setup assumes that the agent only consumes at the
end of period  . In Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik and Sannikov (2009), we develop the analog
of Theorem 1 where the agent consumes in each period, for the case of  () = ln  and a
CRRA utility function. The contract remains tractable.
7. Renegotiation. With a noise-independent action, there is no scope for renegotiation after
the agent observes the noise. With a noise-dependent action, since the contract specifies
an optimal action for every realization of , again there is no incentive to renegotiate.

3

The Optimal Eﬀort Level

The analysis has thus far focused on the optimal implementation of a given path of actions
or action functions. Solving the full contracting problem — the choice of the optimal action,
in addition to its implementation — is typically highly complex. Grossman and Hart (1983)
develop a numerical method to find the optimal eﬀort level. He (2009a,b) and Biais et al.
(2010) consider a binary eﬀort decision and focus on the optimal contract that implements the
high eﬀort level. They then derive a condition to guarantee that high eﬀort is optimal; given the
binary action space, such a condition is relatively simple. Section 3.1 derives a condition under
which the optimal action can be solved from a continuous action space — if the benefit of eﬀort is
suﬃciently large, the principal wishes to implement the maximum productive eﬀort level for all
noise realizations (the “maximum eﬀort principle”). Section 3.2 allows the principal to choose
the maximum productive eﬀort level according to the environment, and generates comparative
statics.
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3.1

Maximum Eﬀort Principle

We consider the optimal action function  (), specializing to  = 1 for simplicity and dropping
the time index. The principal chooses  () to maximize
max

{()}

Z

 ( ()  )  ()  −  [] 

(26)

¢
¡
The first term represents the productivity of eﬀort, where  () = min  ()   and   
¡
¢
is the maximum productive eﬀort level. The min  ()   function conveys the fact that,
while the action space may be unbounded ( may be infinite), there is a limit to the number of
productive activities the agent can undertake to benefit the principal. For example, in a cash
flow diversion model,  reflects zero stealing; in an eﬀort model, there is a limit to the number
of hours a day the agent can work while remaining productive. In a project selection model,
there is a limit to the number of positive-NPV projects available;  reflects taking all of these
projects while rejecting negative-NPV projects. In addition to being economically realistic, this
assumption is useful technically as it prevents the optimal action from being infinite. Actions
   do not benefit the principal, but improve the signal: one interpretation is manipulation
(see Appendix C for further details). Clearly, the principal will never wish to implement   .
For brevity, we use “maximum eﬀort” to refer to maximum productive eﬀort . (·) is the
productivity function of eﬀort which is diﬀerentiable with respect to  ().  () is the density
of , assumed to be finite. The second term,  [], is the expected cost of the contract required
to implement  () (we suppress the dependence on  for brevity).
We assume that  is strictly convex and that  ◦ ( 0 )−1 and  0 are convex; these assumptions
are satisfied for many standard cost functions, e.g.  () = 2 and  () =  for   0. The
following Proposition bounds the diﬀerence in the costs of the contract implementing maximum
eﬀort, and an arbitrary contract:19
¡ ¢
Proposition 3 (Bound on diﬀerence in costs.) There exists a function    such that, for
all plans { ()} where ∀  () ≤ ,
Z
h i
¡ ¢¡
¢
  −  [] ≤     −  () 

(27)

Proof. See Appendix.
The next Theorem gives conditions under which maximum eﬀort is optimal.
³
h i
´
¡ ¢
The proof shows that we can take    = max    ()  0 . We use partial derivatives such
 []  (). Their meaning is traditional and is as follows. Under weak conditions,  [·] is diﬀerentiable
, in the sense that there is a function
 () (unique up to sets of measure 0) such that, for any { ()},
R
lim→0 ( [ + ] −  [])  =  ()  () . Then, we define  []  () =  ().
19

21

¡ ¢
Theorem 3 (Maximum eﬀort principle). Assume that ∀ ∀ ≤ , 1  ( )  () ≥    ,
i.e. the marginal benefit of eﬀort is suﬃciently large. Then, the optimal plan is to implement
maximum eﬀort,  () = .
Proof. For any plan,
Z

¢
¡ ¡ ¢
   −  ( ()  )  ()  ≥

Z

Z

¡
¢
inf 1  ( )  −  ()  () 


¡ ¢¡
¢
    −  () 
h i
≥   −  []

≥

by Proposition 3. Hence,
Z

h i Z
¡ ¢
    ()  −   ≥  ( ()  )  ()  −  []

i.e., the principal’s objective is maximized by inducing maximum eﬀort.
Theorem 3 shows that, if the marginal benefit of eﬀort is suﬃciently greater than the
marginal cost, than maximum eﬀort is optimal. (This is a similar condition to that which
guarantees the optimality of high eﬀort in He (2009a,b) and Biais et al. (2010).) A suﬃcient
(although unnecessary) condition is for the firm to be suﬃciently large. To demonstrate this, we
parameterize the  function by  ( ) = ∗ ( ), where  is the baseline value of the output
under the agent’s control. For example, if the agent is a CEO,  is firm size; if he is a divisional
manager,  is the size of his division. We will refer to  as firm size for brevity. Under this
specification, the benefit of eﬀort is multiplicative in firm size. This is plausible for most agent
actions, which can be “rolled out” across the whole company and thus have a greater eﬀect in
a larger firm. Examples include the choice of strategy, the launch of new projects, or increasing
production eﬃciency.20
Let  denote the complementary cumulative distribution function of , i.e.  () =
¡ ¢
Pr ( ≥ ). We assume that sup  ()  ()  ∞ and inf  1 ∗    0, and define:
¡ ¢
Λ 
¡ ¢
∗ =
inf  1 ∗  

¡ ¢
Λ  ≡

0 () +  00 () sup

 ()
 ()

¡
¡
¢¢ 
 0 −1 −1 () + () + ( − ) 0 ()

(28)

Calculations in the Online Appendix show that, if   ∗ , i.e. the firm is suﬃciently large,
then it is optimal for the principal to induce maximum eﬀort. Indeed, in Proposition 3 we can
¡ ¢
¡ ¢
take    = Λ  ().
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Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon (2009) provide empirical evidence that CEOs have the same
percentage eﬀect on firm value, regardless of firm size; Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009) show that a multiplicative production function is necessary to generate empirically consistent predictions for the scaling of various
measures of incentives with firm size.
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¡ ¢
The intuition for the above is as follows. The numerator of Λ  contains the two costs
of inducing higher eﬀort — the disutility imposed on the agent (the first term) plus the risk
imposed by the incentive contract required to implement eﬀort (the second term). These are
scaled by the denominator, where the term in brackets is an upper bound on the pay received
by the agent. The costs of eﬀort are thus of similar order of magnitude to the agent’s pay. The
benefit of eﬀort is enhanced firm value and thus of similar order of magnitude to firm size. If
the firm is suﬃciently large (  ∗ ), the benefits of eﬀort outweigh the costs and so maximum
productive eﬀort is optimal. A simple numerical example illustrates. Consider a firm with a
$10b market value and, to be conservative, assume that maximum eﬀort increases firm value
by only 1%. Then, maximum eﬀort creates $100m of value, which vastly outweighs the agent’s
salary. Even if it is necessary to double the agent’s salary to compensate him for the costs of
increased eﬀort, this is swamped by the benefits.
The comparative statics on the threshold firm size ∗ are intuitive. First, ∗ is increasing
in noise dispersion, because the firm must be large enough for maximum eﬀort to be optimal
for all noise realizations. Indeed, a rise in  −  increases −1 () + () + ( − )0 (), lowers
, and raises sup   . (For example, if the noise is uniform, then sup   =  − .) Second,
it is increasing in the agent’s risk aversion parameterized by  and thus the risk imposed by
incentives. Third, it is increasing in the disutility of eﬀort, and thus the marginal cost of eﬀort
¡ ¢
 0  and the convexity of the cost function 00 (). Fourth, it is decreasing in the marginal
¡ ¢
benefit of eﬀort (inf  1 ∗   ). Thus, the maximum eﬀort principle is especially likely to hold
if noise, risk aversion and the cost of eﬀort are small.
We conjecture the above condition applies in more general settings than those considered above. For instance, it likely continues to hold if the principal’s objective function is
R
max{()}  ( ()  )  ()  −  [] and the action space is bounded above by  — i.e.  (the
maximum feasible eﬀort level) equals  (the maximum productive eﬀort level). This slight variant is economically very similar, since the principal never wishes to implement  ()   in our
setting, but substantially more complicated mathematically, because the agent’s action space
now has boundaries and so the incentive constraints become inequalities. We leave this extension to future research. Hellwig (2007) shows that this reason alone is suﬃcient for a boundary
eﬀort level to be always optimal in a multiperiod discrete model and a continuous-time model
that can be approximated by a discrete-time model, even in the absence of the condition on the
benefit of eﬀort featured in this paper. Since the incentive constraints are inequalities with a
boundary eﬀort level, the principal has greater freedom in choosing the contract, which allows
her to select a cheaper contract. Thus, the maximum eﬀort result holds in settings even without
a large benefit of eﬀort. Lacker and Weinberg (1989) similarly derive a condition under which
maximum eﬀort (zero diversion in their setting) is optimal, for the case  () = . In DeMarzo
and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and Biais et al. (2007), zero diversion is
optimal since the agent is risk-neutral and so there is no trade-oﬀ between risk and incentives.
Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik and Sannikov (2009) extend the maximum eﬀort principle to general
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 , for the case where  () = ln  (multiplicative preferences) and  is CRRA.
In the full contracting problem, which solves for both the optimal eﬀort level and the
cheapest implementing contract, tractable contracts are attained by forcing a constant incentive
slope on the agent to rule out the ambiguous reward for performance. This is achieved in
our paper through two key mechanisms. First, we achieve a constant marginal cost of eﬀort
by implementing a constant target action. This requires the removal of dynamics so that the
action that the principal wishes to implement is independent of prior period outcomes. Previous
papers remove dynamics via removing wealth eﬀects, so that the cost of implementing a given
action is constant. For example, HM assume CARA utility and a pecuniary cost of eﬀort,
so that wealth has no eﬀect on the agent’s risk aversion, and has an identical eﬀect on the
felicity from cash and cost of eﬀort. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman
(2007) and Biais et al. (2007) assume risk-neutrality, so that risk aversion is independent of
wealth (it is always zero) and the marginal utility of money is constant. The key insight of
this paper is that we can remove dynamics without removing wealth eﬀects, and thus without
imposing constraints on the utility function or the cost of eﬀort. Specifically, a constant target
action need not require the cost of implementing the action to be constant — it only requires
changes in these costs to be small compared to the benefits of eﬀort. If the benefits of eﬀort are
suﬃciently large (e.g. the firm is big), maximum eﬀort remains optimal regardless of how the
cost of implementing eﬀort changes over time. Thus, our formulation allows for wealth eﬀects
to exist (and thus the utility function to be unrestricted), while at the same time removing
dynamics and thus achieving tractability because such eﬀects are small. Second, our timing
assumption forces the constant marginal cost of eﬀort (which is a consequence of the constant
action) to equal the marginal felicity from cash state-by-state, and thus requires the reward for
performance to be the same after every noise realization.
We caveat that the suﬃcient conditions for Theorem 3 to hold may not in certain settings
— for example, if the agent is a rank-and-file employee with little eﬀect on firm value, or if
there is substantial uncertainty (i.e. the noise dispersion is high). Thus, a simple solution to
the full contracting problem is not attainable in all settings. However, when applicable, the
maximum eﬀort principle leads to substantial tractability and convenience, since it removes the
need to solve for an interior optimal eﬀort level. In sum, the paper provides a set of suﬃcient
conditions under which a simple solution to the full contracting problem can be obtained —
actions following noise and a large benefit of eﬀort — which is quite diﬀerent than considered
in prior literature (e.g. the HM assumptions). They may therefore hold in settings where
the alternative assumptions are not satisfied and tractability was previously believed to be
unattainable.
In addition, Theorem 3 can be interpreted as providing the conditions under which the
assumption of a fixed eﬀort level, undertaken by a number of prior papers, is valid. For example,
in their calibration of CEO compensation contracts, Dittmann and Maug (2007) and Dittmann,
Maug and Spalt (2009) assume a given eﬀort level and investigate whether an alternative
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contract can implement the same eﬀort level more cheaply. Since they study CEOs, and the
maximum eﬀort principle is particularly likely to apply to CEOs, Theorem 3 rationalizes this
approach.
Appendix E considers other suﬃcient conditions required for Proposition 3 to hold, which
do not assume the benefit of eﬀort is multiplicative in firm size. That section also shows that
we can derive the optimal { ()} in certain cases even where the maximum eﬀort principle
does not apply.

3.2

Determinants of the Maximum Eﬀort Level

The previous section assumed that the maximum productive eﬀort level  is exogenous. This
section allows the principal to choose it endogenously according to the environment. We extend
the contracting game to two stages. In the first stage, the principal chooses . In practice, this
may be achieved by physical investment, training the agent, or organizational design. For
example, building a larger plant gives the agent greater scope to add value; training the agent
or choosing an organizational structure that gives him greater freedom have the same eﬀect.
Since physical investment, training and organizational design are costly to reverse, we model
this decision as irreversible. In the second stage, the game studied in the core model is played
out. In this stage, the action  may respond to the noise , but the maximum productive eﬀort
 has been fixed.
The principal’s payoﬀ is:
Z

¢
¢
¡
¡
 min  ()       −  []

(29)

¡
¢
where     is weakly increasing in  and decreasing in . Higher flexibility  is costly to
¡
¢
¡ ¢
¡ ¢
the principal — for instance, we could have     =  ( ) −   , where   is the cost
of implementing flexibility level .
Before we state the result formally, we summarize it. Under conditions described below, in
the second stage, the principal will wish to implement the contract in Theorem 1 with ∗ = ,
i.e. the maximum eﬀort principle applies. In the first stage, when choosing , she will trade oﬀ
the costs and benefits of higher maximum eﬀort. For instance, in the examples at the end of
this section,  is decreasing in the agent’s disutility of eﬀort and the noise dispersion. A tradeoﬀ exists in the first stage because the costs and benefits of flexibility are of similar order of
magnitude. For example, increasing plant size has a continuous eﬀect on firm value and involves
a significant cost, which is also a function of firm size. However, it does not exist in the second
stage because the costs of eﬀort are now a function of the agent’s salary, and the benefits are
discontinuous. Once the plant has been built, the agent must run it fully eﬃciently to prevent
significant value loss — even small imperfections will cause large reductions in value and so the
marginal benefit of eﬀort is high (analogous to Kremer’s (1993) O-ring theory). Thus, this
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enriched game features a simple optimal contract (since the target action in the second stage in
constant), but one which also responds to the comparative statics of the environment. It may
thus be a potentially useful way of modeling various economic problems, to achieve tractability
while at the same time generating comparative statics.
To proceed formally, consider the two following problems.
Problem 1 : maximize over  and all unrestricted contracts:
£ ¡
¡
¢
¢¤
max   min  ()      −  [] 

{()}

Problem 2 : maximize over  and use the contract in Theorem 1 which implements :
£ ¡
¢¤
£ ¤
max      −   


£ ¤
where   is the expected cost of the contract implementing a constant action .
Problem 2 optimizes over only a scalar , while Problem 1 optimizes over a whole continuum
of contracts, including those that do not implement maximum eﬀort. However, under some
simple conditions, Problem 2 is not restrictive — both problems have the same solution.
Proposition 4 (Maximum eﬀort in two-stage game). Let ∗∗ denote the value of  in a solution
to Problem 1, and assume that ∗∗   and that ∀, inf  1  (  ∗∗ )  () ≥  (∗∗  ). Then,
the solution of Problem 1 is the same solution as Problem 2: that is, the solution of the problem
that implements  () =  is also the solution of the unrestricted contract.
Proof. Immediate given Theorem 3. At ∗∗ , the principal wants to implement maximum eﬀort,
i.e.  () = ∗∗ for all 
At first glance, the condition in Proposition 4 may appear restrictive, since verifying it
requires solving Problem 1. However, suﬃcient conditions are simply inf  1  (  ∗∗ )  () ≥
 (∗∗  ) for all ∗∗ and . The value  can be calculated up to an integral, so bounds are
reasonably straightforward to check in a given setting.
Illustrations We now illustrate the contract and comparative statics in three examples,
for specific cases of  and . We define  () =  [ (  )], the principal’s expected payoﬀ given target eﬀort . The optimal contract gives  = −1 ( 0 ()  + ) where  satisfies
 [ (0 ()  −  () + )] = . Using previous notation,  =  + 0 () . The expected cost of
the contract is  [] ≡  [ ()] =  [ −1 ( 0 ()  + )]. It is straightforward to show that  []
increases in target eﬀort , the agent’s reservation utility , and the dispersion of noise ; the
proof relies on the dispersion techniques used in the Appendix.
The principal’s problem is:
max  () −  []
(30)
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and the optimal contract is the contract described in Theorem 1 implementing a constant .
This is a simple problem to solve in many applied settings.
Example 1. Consider  () = ,  () =  ,  ∈ (0 1]. We have  =  () + , and the
contract is  () = (0 () ( − ) +  () + )1 . The expected cost is21
i
h
1

 [] =  (0 ()  +  () + )

 [] can be obtained in closed form for various specific cases. For example, h = 12 yields
i
 [] = 0 ()2  2 + ( () + )2 ;  = 0 and  () =  yields  [] =   ( + 1)1 .
h
i
The principal chooses  to maximize  () −   ( + 1)1 . Simple calculations show
that the target action is decreasing in the marginal cost of eﬀort , risk aversion  and the
dispersion of noise .
Example 2. Consider  () = ln  and  () = (1−)  (1 − ) for   1, so that the
¡
¢1−
utility function is −()
 (1 − ), as is commonly used in macroeconomics: it is CRRA
in consumption and multiplicative in consumption and eﬀort. We also assume  ∼  (0 2 ).
Then, the contract is  () = exp (0 () ( − ) + ) with  = ln  +  () − (1 − )  0 ()2  2 2,
where  (ln ) is the reservation utility. The expected cost of the contract is:
¡
¢
 [] =  exp  () + 0 ()2  2 2 .

Again, calculations show that  is decreasing in the cost of eﬀort, risk aversion and noise dispersion. We thus obtain the standard comparative statics, but for a contract that is log-linear,
rather than linear in returns. Murphy (1999) argues that log-linear contracts are empirically
more relevant.
Example 3. Consider  () = ,  () = 12 2 ,  () = −− with    0, and  ∼
 (0 2 ) as in HM. The cost of the contract is  [] =  +  () +  0 ()2  2 2, and the same
three comparative statics hold.
Note that HM not only have a constant target action, but an additive eﬀect of eﬀort.
¡
¢
¡
¢ ¡ ¢
¡ ¢
We can obtain this result with     =  +  −     , for some function    ≥
¡ ¢
    (). In the second stage of the game, having chosen , the principal wishes to
implement constant eﬀort  for all , because the marginal cost of shirking (parameterized by
) is suﬃciently high. Moving to the first stage, since the principal knows that  =  in the
¡
¢
second stage, her benefit function is     = : eﬀort has an additive eﬀect.
The key complication in obtaining the HM result is reconciling the linear marginal benefit
of eﬀort required for an additive eﬀect, with the high marginal benefit of eﬀort required for the
maximum eﬀort principle to apply to guarantee a constant action. The two-stage game resolves
21

0
A variant is the case  () =  and  () = ln
h .0 Then,
i the contract is ln  () =  () ( − ) +  () + ,
and the expected cost is  () = exp [ () + ]   () 
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this tension because the marginal benefit of eﬀort is moderate in the first stage and very high
in the second stage, as discussed in the plant example earlier.
Under this formulation, the cost of the contract implementing  =  is  [] =  + 12 2 +
2
 2 2 2
   and the principal maximizes  −  − 12  − 2 2 2  2 which yields the result  =
2
1 (1 + 2 ), exactly as in HM. Thus, using the HM conditions of exponential utility, a
pecuniary quadratic cost of eﬀort and Gaussian noise in the above specification, leads to the
same optimal contract (not just the implementation contract) as in HM.
In Appendix E, we also provide explicit conditions under which maximum eﬀort is optimal for the three above examples, i.e. a specialization of the conditions in Proposition 4 to
these cases. These conditions allow straightforward verification of whether the maximum eﬀort
principle holds.

4

Conclusion

This paper has identified and analyzed a class of multiperiod situations in which the optimal
implementation contract is tractable, without requiring exponential utility, a pecuniary cost of
eﬀort, Gaussian noise or continuous time. The contract’s functional form is independent of the
agent’s utility function, reservation utility and noise distribution. Furthermore, when the cost
of eﬀort can be expressed in financial terms, the contract is linear and so the slope, in addition
to the functional form, is independent of these parameters.
The key to tractability in discrete time is specifying the noise before the action in each period,
which forces the incentive compatibility constraint to hold state-by-state rather than just on
average, and tightly constraints the set of contracts available to the principle. The optimal
contract is very similar in continuous time, where noise and actions occur simultaneously.
Hence, if underlying reality is continuous time, it is best approximated in discrete time under
our timing assumption. We extend our analysis to implementing a noise-dependent target
action and provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a particular action function to be
implementable.
We derive a condition under which the full contracting problem — the optimal action function
in addition to its implementation — can be solved tractably. If the benefit of eﬀort is suﬃciently
large (e.g. the agent is a CEO with a multiplicative eﬀect on firm value), then it is optimal to
implement maximum eﬀort for all noise realizations. Our two-stage model allows the principal
to choose the target eﬀort level to respond to the details of the environment, while retaining
tractability. The principal initially sets a lower maximum productive eﬀort level if the agent is
more risk averse or faces a higher cost of eﬀort or greater noise. However, in each subsequent
period, the principal wishes the agent to exert maximum eﬀort, regardless of how output evolves.
If the benefits of eﬀort are suﬃciently high (e.g. the firm is much larger than the agent’s salary),
they swamp the costs, and so the optimal eﬀort level is independent of how the agent’s wealth
evolves over time.
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Our paper suggests several avenues for future research. The HM framework has proven
valuable in many areas of applied contract theory owing to its tractability; however, some models
have used the HM result in settings where the assumptions are not satisfied (see the critique of
Hemmer (2004)). Our framework allows tractable contracts to be achieved in such situations. In
particular, our contracts are valid in situations where time is discrete, utility cannot be modeled
as exponential (e.g. in calibrated models where it is necessary to capture decreasing absolute
risk aversion), eﬀort is non-pecuniary, or noise is not Gaussian (e.g. is bounded). While
we considered the specific application of executive compensation, other possibilities include
bank regulation, team production, insurance or taxation.22 In ongoing work (Edmans, Gabaix,
Sadzik and Sannikov (2009)) we extend tractable contracts to a dynamic setting where the
agent consumes in each period and can privately save.
In addition, while our model has relaxed a number of assumptions required for tractability,
it continues to impose a number of restrictions. In particular, we are only able to achieve a
tractable solution to the full contracting problem if the maximum eﬀort principle applies or
in certain other cases (e.g. linear cost of eﬀort). Grossman and Hart (1983) and Garrett and
Pavan (2009) show that solving for the optimal action in a general case is typically extremely
complex; whether we can extend tractability to broader settings is an important area for future
research. Similarly, while Section 2.3 allows for the action to depend on the noise in period
, a useful extension would be to allow the action to depend on the full history of outcomes.
Other restrictions are mostly technical rather than economic. For example, our multiperiod
model assumes independent noises with log-concave density functions; and our extension to
noise-dependent target actions assumes an open action set where the maximum feasible eﬀort
level exceeds the maximum productive eﬀort level. Some of these assumptions may not be valid
in certain situations, limiting the applicability of our framework. Further research may be able
to broaden the current setup.

22

See Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) and Farhi and Werning (2009) for taxation applicaitons
of the principal-agent problem.
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Eﬀort (also referred to as “action”)
Maximum eﬀort
Maximum productive eﬀort
Target eﬀort
Benefit function for eﬀort, defined over 
Cash compensation, defined over  or 
Density of the noise distribution
Cost of eﬀort, defined over 
Signal (or “return”), typically  =  + 
Agent’s utility function, defined over  () −  ()
Agent’s reservation utility
Agent’s felicity function, defined over 
Noise
Action function, defined over 
©
¡ ¢ª
Expected cost of contract implementing  ()   ∈  
Complementary cumulative distribution function of 
Message sent by agent to the principal
Baseline size of output under agent’s control
Number of periods
Felicity provided by contract, defined over  or 
Table 1: Key Variables in the Model.

A

Mathematical Preliminaries

This section derives some mathematical results that we use for the main proofs.

A.1

Dispersion of Random Variables

We repeatedly use the “dispersive order” for random variables to show that IC constraints bind.
Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, Section 3.B) provide an excellent summary of known facts
about this concept. This section provides a self-contained guide of the relevant results for our
paper, as well as proving some new results.
We commence by defining the notion of relative dispersion. Let  and  denote two random
variables with cumulative distribution functions  and  and corresponding right continuous
inverses  −1 and −1 .  is said to be less dispersed than  if and only if  −1 () −  −1 () ≤
−1 () − −1 () whenever 0   ≤   1. This concept is location-free:  is less dispersed
than  if and only if it is less dispersed than  + , for any real constant .
A basic property is the following result (Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), p.151):
Lemma 1 Let  be a random variable and  ,  be functions such that 0 ≤  () −  () ≤
 () −  () whenever  ≤ . Then  () is less dispersed than  ().
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This result is intuitive:  magnifies diﬀerences to a greater extent than  , leading to more
dispersion. We will also use the next two comparison lemmas.
Lemma 2 Assume that  is less dispersed than  and let  denote a weakly increasing function,  a weakly increasing concave function, and  a weakly increasing convex function. Then:
E [ ()] ≥ E [ ( )] ⇒ E [ ( ())] ≥ E [ ( ( ))]
E [ ()] ≤ E [ ( )] ⇒ E [ ( ())] ≤ E [ ( ( ))] 
Proof. The first statement comes directly from Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), Theorem
3.B.2, which itself is taken from Landsberger and Meilijson (1994). The second statement is
b = −, b = − , b() = − (−),  () = − (−). It can
derived from the first, applied to 
be verified directly (or via consulting Shakedh and
(2007), Theorem
that
³ Shanthikumar
´i
h ³ ´i
h ³ 3.B.6)
³ ´´i
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
 is less dispersed than  . In addition, E  
≥ E   . Thus, E   
≥
h ³ ³ ´´i
³ ³ ´´
b
E  b b
. Substituting  b 
= − ( ()) yields E [− ( ())] ≥ E [− ( ( ))].
Lemma 2 is intuitive: if E [ ()] ≥ E [ ( )], applying a concave function  should maintain the inequality. Conversely, if E [ ()] ≤ E [ ( )], applying a convex function  should
maintain the inequality. In addition, if E [] = E [ ], Lemma 2 implies that  second-order
stochastically dominates  . Hence, it is a stronger concept than second-order stochastic dominance.
Lemma 2 allows us to prove Lemma 3 below, which states that the NIARA property of a
utility function is preserved by adding a log-concave random variable to its argument.

Lemma 3 Let  denote a utility function with NIARA and  a random variable with a logconcave distribution. Then, the utility function 
b defined by 
b () ≡ E [ ( +  )] exhibits
NIARA.
Proof. Consider two constants    and a lottery  independent from  . Let  and  be
the certainty equivalents of  with respect to utility function 
b and evaluated at points  and
 respectively, i.e. defined by

b ( +  ) = E [ ( + )] 


b ( +  ) = E [ ( + )] 


b exhibits NIARA if and only if  ≤  , i.e. the certainty equivalent increases with
wealth. To prove that  ≤  , we make three observations. First, since  exhibits NIARA,
there exists an increasing concave function  such that  ( + ) =  ( ( + )) for all .
Second, because  is log-concave,  +  is less dispersed than  +  by Theorem 3.B.7 of
Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007). Third, by definition of  and the independence of  and
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, we have E [ ( +  +  )] = E [ ( +  + )]. Hence, we can apply Lemma 2, which yields
E [ ( ( +  +  ))] ≥ E [ ( ( +  + ))], i.e.
E [ ( +  +  )] ≥ E [ ( +  + )] = E [ ( +  +  )] by definition of  
Thus we have  ≥  as required.

A.2

Subderivatives

Since we cannot assume that the optimal contract is diﬀerentiable, we use the notion of subderivatives to allow for quasi first-order conditions in all cases.
Definition 1 For a point  and function  defined in a left neighborhood of , we define the
subderivative of  at  as:
 () −  ()

 ≡ −0 () ≡ lim inf
↑
−
−
This notion will prove useful since −0 () is well-defined for all functions  (with perhaps
infinite values). We take limits “from below,” as we will often apply the subderivative at the
maximum feasible eﬀort level . If  is left-diﬀerentiable at , then −0 () =  0 ().
We use the following Lemma to allow us to integrate inequalities with subderivatives. All
the Lemmas in this subsection are proven in the Online Appendix.
Lemma 4 Assume that, over an interval : (i) −0 () ≥  () ∀ , for an continuous function
 () and (ii) there is a  1 function  such that  +  is nondecreasing. Then, for two points
R
 ≤  in ,  () −  () ≥   () .
Condition (ii) prevents  () from exhibiting discontinuous downwards jumps, which would
prevent integration.23
The following Lemma is the chain rule for subderivatives.
Lemma 5 Let  be a real number and  be a function defined in a left neighborhood of .
Suppose that function  is diﬀerentiable at  (), with 0 ( ())  0. Then, ( ◦  )0− () =
0 ( ()) −0 ().
In general, subderivatives typically follow the usual rules of calculus, with inequalities instead of equalities. One example is below.
Lemma 6 Let  be a real number and  ,  be functions defined in a left neighborhood of . Then
( + )0− () ≥ −0 ()+0− (). When  is diﬀerentiable at , then ( + )0− () = −0 ()+0 ().
23

0
For example,  () = 1 { ≤ 0} satisfies condition (i) as −
() = 0 ∀ , but violates both condition (ii)
and the conclusion of the Lemma, as  (−1)   (1).
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B

Detailed Proofs

Throughout these proofs, we use tildes to denote random variables. For example, e is the noise
viewed as a random variable and  is a particular
 )] denotes the
h
irealization of that noise. E [ (e
e
expectation over all realizations of e and E  (e
 ) denotes the expectation over all realizations
e
of both  and a stochastic function .

Proof of Theorem 1
Roadmap. We divide the proof in three parts. The first part shows that messages are
redundant, so that we can restrict the analysis to contracts without messages. This part of the
proof is standard and can be skipped at a first reading. The second part proves the theorem
considering only deterministic contracts and assuming that ∗   ∀ . This case requires
weaker assumptions (see Proposition 1). The third part, which is significantly more complex,
rules out randomized contracts and allows for the target eﬀort to be the maximum . Both
these extensions require the concepts of subderivatives and dispersion from Appendix A.
1). Redundancy of Messages
Let r denote the vector (1    ) and define η and a analogously. Define g (a) =  (1 ) +
+ ( ). Let e (rη) =  (e
 (rη)) denote the felicity given by a message-dependent contract
if the agent reports η and the realized signals are r. Under the revelation principle, we can
restrict the analysis to mechanisms that induce the agent to truthfully report the noise η. The
b = η:
incentive compatibility (IC) constraint is that the agent exerts eﬀort a and reports η
h ³
´i
h ³
´i
∗
∗
e
e
b ) − g (a) ≤ E   (η + a  η) − g (a ) 
∀ ∀b
  ∀a E   (η + a η

(31)

h
³
´i
e ) , subject to
The principal’s problem is to minimize expected pay E −1 e (e
η + a∗  η
the IC constraint (31), and the agent’s individual rationality (IR) constraint
´i
h ³
e ) − g (a∗ ) ≥ 
η + a∗  η
E  e (e

(32)

Since r = r∗ ≡ a∗ +η on the equilibrium path, the message-dependent contract is equivalent
to e (r r − a∗ ). We consider replacing this with a new contract e (r), which only depends on
the realized signal and not on any messages, and yields the same felicity as the corresponding
message-dependent contract. Thus, the felicity it gives is defined by:
e (r) = e (r r − a∗ ) 
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(33)

The IC and IR constraints for the new contract are given by:
´i
h ³
h ³
´i
∀ ∀ E  e (r) −  (a) ≤ E  e (r∗ ) −  (a∗ ) 
h ³
´i
E  e (r∗ ) −  (a∗ ) ≥ 

(34)
(35)

b 6= η, he must take action a such that η+a =b
If the agent reports η
η +a∗ . Substituting
b = η+a − a∗ into (31) and (32) indeed yields (34) and (35) above. Thus, the IC and IR
η
constraints of the new contract are satisfied. Moreover, the new contract costs exactly the
same as the old contract, since it yields the same felicity by (33). Hence, the new contract
e (r) induces incentive compatibility and participation at the same cost as the initial contract
e (r η) with messages, and so messages are not useful. The intuition is that a∗ is always
exerted, so the principal can already infer η from the signal r without requiring messages.
2). Deterministic Contracts, in the case ∗   ∀ 
We will prove the Theorem by induction on  .
2a). Case  = 1. Dropping the time subscript for brevity, the incentive compatibility (IC)
constraint is:
∀ ∀ :  ( + ) −  () ≤  ( + ∗ ) −  (∗ )
Defining  =  + ∗ and 0 =  + , we have  = ∗ + 0 − . The IC constraint can be rewritten:
 (∗ ) −  (∗ + 0 − ) ≤  () −  (0 ) 
Rewriting this inequality interchanging  and 0 yields  (∗ ) −  (∗ +  − 0 ) ≤  (0 ) −  (),
and so:
 (∗ ) −  (∗ + 0 − ) ≤  () −  (0 ) ≤  (∗ +  − 0 ) −  (∗ ) 
(36)
We first consider   0 . Dividing through by  − 0 yields:
 (∗ ) −  (∗ + 0 − )
 () −  (0 )
 (∗ +  − 0 ) −  (∗ )
≤
≤

 − 0
 − 0
 − 0

(37)

Since ∗ is in the interior of the action space A and the support of  is open, there exists 0
in the neighborhood of . Taking the limit 0 ↑ , the first and third terms of (37) converge to
0
0
∗
0
 0 (∗ ). Therefore, the left derivative 
 () exists, and equals  ( ). Second, consider    .
Dividing (36) through by  − 0 , and taking the limit 0 ↓  shows that the right derivative
0

() exists, and equals 0 (∗ ). Therefore,
 0 () = 0 (∗ ) 
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(38)

Since  has interval support24 , we can integrate to obtain, for some integration constant :
 () = 0 (∗ )  + .

(39)

2b). If the Theorem holds for  , it holds for  + 1. This part is as in the main text.
Note that the above proof (for deterministic contracts where ∗  ) does not require logconcavity of  , nor that  satisfies NIARA. This is because the contract (7) is the only incentive
compatible contract. These assumptions are only required for the general proof, where other
contracts (e.g. randomized ones) are also incentive compatible, to show that they are costlier
than contract (7).
3). General Proof
We no longer restrict ∗ to be in the interior of A, and allow for randomized contracts. We
wish to prove the following statement Σ by induction on integer  :
Statement Σ  Consider a utility function  with NIARA, independent random variables
e1   e where e2   e are log-concave, and a sequence of nonnegative numbers  0h(∗1³)    0 (∗ ). ´i
Consider the set of (potentially randomized) contracts e (1    ) such that (i) E  e (e
1   e ) ≥
; (ii) ∀  = 1 ,
i
i
h ³
´
h ³
´

1   e   e ) | e1   e
E  e (e
1   e +   e ) | e1   e
≥  0 (∗ ) E 0 e (e
 −
|=0
(40)
h ³
i
´
and (iii) ∀  = 1  , E  e (e
1   e   e ) | e1   e is nondecreasing in e .
In this set, for any increasing and convex cost function , E [ ( (e
1   e ))] is minimized
P 0 ∗
0
with contract:  (1    ) =
=1  ( )  + , where  is a constant that makes the
participation constraint (i) bind.

Condition (ii) is the local IC constraint, for deviations from below.
We first consider the case of deterministic contracts, and then show that randomized contracts are costlier. We use the notation E [·] = E [· | e1   e ] to denote the expectation based
on time- information.
3a). Deterministic Contracts
The key diﬀerence from the proof in 2) is that we now must allow for ∗ = .

3ai). Proof of Statement Σ when  = 1.

(40) becomes 
 ( ( + ))|=0 ≥  0 (∗1 ) 0 ( ()). Applying Lemma 5 to  = −1 yields:
−
−0 () ≥  0 (∗ ) 
24

(41)

The model could be extended to allowing non-interval support: if the domain of  was a union of disjoint
intervals, we would have a diﬀerent integration constant  for each interval.
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It is intuitive that (41) should bind, as this minimizes the variability in the agent’s pay
and thus constitutes eﬃcient risk-sharing. We now prove that this is indeed the case; to
simplify exposition, we normalize  (∗ ) = 0 w.l.o.g.25 If constraint (41) binds, the contract is
 0 () =  0 (∗ )  + , where  satisfies E [ ( 0 (∗ )  + )] = . We wish to show that any
other contract  () that satisfies (41) is weaklier costlier.
By assumption (iii) in Statement Σ1 ,  is nondecreasing. We can therefore apply Lemma 4
to equation (41), where condition (ii) of the Lemma is satisfied by  () ≡ 0. This implies that
for  ≤ 0 ,  (0 ) −  () ≥  0 (∗ ) (0 − ) =  0 (0 ) −  0 (). Thus, using Lemma 1,  (e
) is
0
more dispersed than  (e
).
Since  must also satisfy the participation constraint, we have:
£ ¡
¢¤
) 
E [ ( (e
))] ≥  = E   0 (e

(42)

Applying Lemma 2 to the convex function  ◦ −1 and inequality (42), we have:
¤
£
¡
¢¤
£
)) ≥ E  ◦ −1 ◦   0 (e
) ,
E  ◦ −1 ◦  ( (e

))]. The expected cost of  0 is weakly less than for  . Hence,
i.e. E [ ( (e
))] ≥ E [ ( 0 (e
the contract  0 is cost-minimizing.
We note that this last part of the reasoning underpins item 2 in Section 2.4, the extension
to a risk-averse principal. Suppose that the principal wants to minimize E [ ()], where  is
an increasing and concave function, rather than E []. Then, the above contract is optimal if
 ◦ −1 ◦ −1 is convex, i.e.  ◦  ◦ −1 is concave. This requires  to be “not too concave,” i.e.
the agent to be not too risk-averse.
Finally, we verify that the contract  0 satisfies the global IC constraint. The agent’s objective function becomes  (0 (∗ ) ( + ) −  ()). Since  () is convex, the argument of  (·) is
concave. Hence, the first-order condition gives the global optimum.
3aii). Proof that if Statement Σ holds for  , it holds for  + 1. We define a new utility
function 
b as follows:
£ ¡
¡
¢
¢¤

b () = E   + 0 ∗ +1 e +1 
(43)
¡
¢
b has the same
Since e +1 is log-concave, 0 ∗ +1 e +1 is also log-concave. From Lemma 3, 
NIARA property as .
For each e1   e , we define  (e
1   e ) as the solution to equation (44) below:
25

1   e +1 ))] 

b ( (e
1   e )) = E [ ( (e

(44)

Formally, this can be achieved by replacing the utility function  () by  () =  ( −  (∗ )) and the
cost function  () by   () =  () −  (∗ ), so that  ( −  ()) =  ( −   ()).
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 represents the expected felicity from contract  based on all noise realizations up to and
including time  .
The goal is to show that any other contract  6=  0 is weakly costlier. To do so, we wish
to apply Statement Σ for utility function 
b and contract , The first step is to show that, if
Conditions (i)-(iii) hold for utility function  and contract  at time  + 1, they also hold for

b and  at time  , thus allowing us to apply the Statement for these functions.
Taking expectations of (44) over e1   e yields:
1   e +1 ))] ≥ 
E [b
 ( (e
1   e ))] = E [ ( (e

(45)

where the inequality comes from Condition (i) for utility function  and contract  at time
 + 1. Hence, Condition (i) holds for utility function 
b and contract  at time . In addition,
it is immediate that E [b
 ( (e
1   e )) | e1   e ] is nondecreasing in e . (Condition (iii)). We
thus need to show that Condition (ii) is satisfied.
Since equation (40) holds for  =  + 1, we have
¡
¢

 ( (e
1   e  e +1 + )) ≥ 0 ∗ +1 0 [ (e
1   e +1 )] 
 −

Applying Lemma 5 with function  yields:

¡
¢

(1    +1 ) ≥ 0 ∗ +1 
 +1 −

(46)

1   e +1 )
Hence, using Lemma 1 and Lemma 4, we see that conditional on e1   e ,  (e
¡
¢
is more dispersed than  (e
1   e ) +  0 ∗ +1 e +1 .
Using (43), we can rewrite equation (44) as
£ ¡
¡
¢
¢¤
1   e +1 ))] 
1   e ) + 0 ∗ +1 e +1 = E [ ( (e
E   (e

Since  exhibits NIARA, −00 () 0 () is nonincreasing in . This is equivalent to 0 ◦ −1
being weakly convex. We can thus apply Lemma 2 to yield:
¤
¡
£
£
¡
¢
¢¤
E 0 ◦ −1 ◦  ( (e
1   e +1 )) ≥ E 0 ◦ −1 ◦   (e
1   e ) +  0 ∗ +1 e +1 , i.e.
1   e +1 ))] ≥ E [b
0 ( (e
1   e ))] 
E [0 ( (e

(47)

Applying definition (44) to the left-hand side of Condition (ii) for  +1 yields, with  = 1 ,

E [b
 ( (e
1   e +   e ))]|=0 ≥  0 (∗ ) E [0 ( (e
1   e   e +1 )) | e1   e ]
 −

Taking expectations of equation (47) at time  and substituting into the right-hand side of the
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above equation yields:


E [b
 ( (e
1   e +   e ))] =
E [ ( (e
1   e +   e +1 ))]|=0
 −
 −
≥  0 (∗ ) E [b
0 ( (e
1   e ))] 

b at time  ,
Hence the IC constraint holds for contract  (e
1   e ) and utility function 
and so Condition (ii) of Statement Σ is satisfied. We can therefore apply Statement Σ at 
to contract  (1    ), utility function 
b and cost function b defined by:
b () ≡ E [ ( +  0 ( +1 ) e +1 )] 

We observe that the contract  0 =

P +1
=1

(48)

 0 (∗ )  +  satisfies:

" Ã 
!#
" Ã +1
!#
X
X
E 
b
0 (∗ )  + 
=E 
0 (∗ )  + 
= 
=1

=1

b and b implies:
Therefore, applying Statement Σ to  

" Ã +1
!#
h
i
X
 = E b ( (e
1   e )) ≥  0 = E 
0 (∗ ) e + 


(49)

=1

Using equation (48) yields:

1   e ) +  0 ( +1 ) e +1 )] ≥  0
 = E [ ( (e

" Ã +1
!#
X
=E 
 0 (∗ ) e + 

=1

Finally, we compare the cost of contract  (1    ) +  0 ( +1 ) e +1 to the cost of the
original contract  (1    +1 ). Since equation (44) is satisfied, we can apply Lemma 2 to the
convex function  ◦ −1 and the random variable e +1 to yield
£ ¡
¡
¢
¢¤
1   e +1 ))] ≥ E   (e
1   e ) + 0 ∗ +1 e +1
E [ ( (e
¡
¢
¢¤
£ ¡
1   e ) + 0 ∗ +1 e +1 =  ≥  0 
E [ ( (e
1   e +1 ))] ≥ E   (e

where the final inequality comes from (49). Hence the cost of contract  is weakly greater than
the cost of contract  0 . This concludes the proof for  + 1.
3b). Optimality of Deterministic Contracts
Consider a randomized contract e (1    ) and define the “certainty equivalent” contract
 by:
h ³
´i
¡
¢
e
  (1    ) ≡ E   (1    ) 
(50)
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We wish to apply Statement Σ (which we have already proven for deterministic contracts) to
contract  , and so must verify that its three conditions are satisfied.
From the above definition, we obtain
h ³
´i
¢¤
£ ¡
e
1   e ) = E   (e
1   e ) ≥ ,
E   (e

i.e.,  satisfies the participation constraint (32). Hence, Condition (i) holds. Also, it is clear
that Condition (iii) holds for  , given it holds for e . We thus need to show that Condition
−1
(ii) is also satisfied. Applying Jensen’s inequality to equation (50) and the
0 ◦ ´i
h function
³
¢
¡
(which is convex since  exhibits NIARA) yields: 0  (1    ) ≤ E 0 e (1    ) .
We apply this to  = e for  = 1 and take expectations to obtain
´i
h ³
¢¤
£ ¡
0 e
1   e ) ≥ E 0  (e
E   (e
1   e ) 

(51)

Applying definition (50) to the left-hand side of (40) yields:

´i
h ³
¢¤
£ ¡

1   e   e ) 
E   (e
1   e +   e ) |=0 ≥  0 (∗ ) E 0 e (e
 −

and using (51) yields:

¢¤
¢¤
£ ¡
£ ¡

E   (e
1   e +   e ) |=0 ≥ 0 (∗ ) E 0  (e
1   e   e ) 
 −

Condition (ii) of Statement Σ therefore holds for  . We can therefore apply Statement Σ
to show that  0 has a weakly lower cost than  . We next show that the cost of  is weakly
less than the cost of e . Applying
to (50) and the convex function  ◦ −1
h ³ Jensen’s inequality
´i
¡
¢
yields:   (1    ) ≤ E  e (1    ) . We apply this to  = e for  = 1 and
take expectations over the distribution of e to obtain:
h ³
´i
¢
¡
1   e ) ≤ E  e (e
1   e ) 
  (e

Hence  has a weakly lower cost than e . Therefore,  0 has a weakly lower cost than e . This
proves the Statement for randomized contracts.
3c). Main Proof. Having proven Statement Σ , we now turn to the main proof of Theorem
1. The value of the signal on the equilibrium path is given by e ≡ ∗ + e . We define
Ã

 () ≡   −


X
=1

!

 (∗ ) 

(52)

We seek to use Statement Σ applied to function  and random variable e , and thus must
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h ³
´i
verify that its three conditions are satisfied. Since E  e (e
1   e )
≥ , Condition (i)
holds.
The IC constraint for time  is:
Ã
!
X
0 ∈ arg max E  e (∗1 + e1   ∗ + e +   ∗ + e ) −  (∗ + ) −
 (∗ ) 


=16=

i.e.

Ã

1   e +   e ) −  (∗ + ) −
0 ∈ arg max E  e (e


X

!

 (∗ ) 

=16=

(53)

We note that, for a function  (), 0 ∈ arg max  () implies that for all   0, ( (0) −  ())  (−) ≥
0, hence, taking the lim inf ↑0 , we obtain − −0 ()|=0 ≥ 0. Call  () the argument of  in
equation (53). Applying this result to (53), we find: − E  ( ())|=0 ≥ 0.
³
h
´i
Using Lemma 5, we find E 0 ( (0)) −  ()|=0 ≥ 0. Using Lemma 6, −  ()|=0 =
 e
 (e
1   e +   e ) − 0 (∗ ), hence we obtain:
−

∙
µ
¶¸
 e
0
0
∗
≥ 0
E  ( (0))
 (e
1   e +   e ) −  ( )
−

Using again Lemma 5, this can be rewritten:

" Ã
!#
X

E  e (e
 (∗ )
1   e +   e ) −
 −
=1

|=0

≥  0 (∗ ) E [0 ( (0))] 

i.e., using the notation (52),

h ³
h ³
´i
´i

1   e   e ) 
E  e (e
1   e +   e )
≥ 0 (∗ ) E 0 e (e
 −
|=0

Therefore, Condition (ii) of Statement Σ holds.
Finally, we verify Condition (iii). Apply (53) to signal  and deviation   0. We obtain:
" Ã

1   e +   e ) −
E  e (e
" Ã

X

!#

 (∗ )

=1

≥ E  e (e
1   e +   e ) −  (∗ + ) −
" Ã

≥ E  e (1    +    ) −  (∗ ) −

=16=

X

=16=

so Condition (iii) holds for contract e and utility function .
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X

!#

 (∗ )
!#

 (∗ )



We can now apply Statement Σ to contract e and function , to prove that any globally
P
IC contract is weakly costlier than contract  0 = =1  0 (∗ )  + . Moreover, it is clear that
 0 satisfies the global IC conditions in equation (53). Thus,  0 is the cheapest contract that
satisfies the global IC constraint.
Proof of Proposition 1
Conditionally on ( )≤ +1 , we must have:
∗ +1

!
X
¡ ∗
¢
∈ arg max   1 + 1   ∗ +1 +  +1 −  ( +1 ) −
 (∗ ) 
 +1

Ã

6= +1

Using the proof of Theorem 1 with  = 1, this implies that, for  +1 in the interior of the
support of e +1 (given ( )≤ ),  (1    +1 ) can be written:
¡
¢
 (1    +1 ) =  (1    ) +  0 ∗ +1  +1 

for some function  (1    ). Next, consider the problem of implementing action ∗ at time
 . We require that, for all ( )≤ ,
∗ ∈ arg max E


" Ã

!#
X
¡
¢
¡
¢
  (∗1 + 1   ∗ +  ) +  0 ∗ +1  +1 + ∗ +1 −  ( ) −
 (∗ )

6=

This can be rewritten
∗ ∈ arg max 
b ( (∗1 + 1   ∗ +  ) −  ( )) 


h ³
´
i
¡
¢¡
¢ P
where 
b () ≡ E   +  0 ∗ +1  +1 + ∗ +1 − 6=  (∗ ) | 1    .
Using the same arguments as above for  + 1, that implies that, for  in the interior of the
support of e (given ( )≤ −1 ) we can write:
 (1    ) =  −1 (1    −1 ) +  0 (∗ ) 

for some function  −1 (1    − 1). Proceeding by induction, we see that this implies that
we can write, for ( )≤ +1 in the interior of the support of (e
 )≤ +1 ,
 +1 (1    +1 ) =

 +1
X

 0 (∗ )  + 0 

=1

for some constant 0 . This yields the “necessary” first part of the Proposition.
The converse part of the Proposition is immediate. Given the proposed contract, the agent

41

faces the decision:
!#
" Ã 

X
X

0 (∗ )  −  ( ) +
 0 (∗ ) 
max E 

( )≤

=1

=1

which is maximized pointwise when  0 (∗ )  − ( ) is maximized. This in turn requires  = ∗ .
Proof of Theorem 2
We shall use the following purely mathematical Lemma, proven in the Online Appendix.
Lemma 7 Consider a standard Brownian process  with filtration F , a deterministic nonR
R
negative process  , an F −adapted process  ,  ≥ 0,  = 0   , and  = 0   .
Suppose that almost surely, ∀ ∈ [0  ],  ≤  . Then  second-order stochastically dominates
.
Lemma 7 is intuitive: since  ≥  ≥ 0, it makes sense that  is more volatile than .
To derive the IC constraint, we use the methodology introduced by Sannikov (2008). We
R
observe that the term 0   induces a constant shift, so w.l.o.g. we can assume  = 0 ∀ .
For an arbitrary adapted policy function  = ( )∈[0 ] , let  denote the probability meaR
sures induced by . Then,  = 0 ( −  )  is a Brownian motion under  , and
R
∗
∗
 = 0 ( − ∗ )  is a Brownian under  , where ∗ is the policy (∗ )∈[0 ] 
R
Recall that, if the agent exerts policy ∗ , then  = 0 ∗  +   . We define  =  ().
By the martingale representation theorem (Karatzas and Shreve (1991), p. 182) applied to
R
process  =  [ ] for  ∈ [0  ], we can write:  = 0  ( − ∗ ) + 0 for some constant
0 and a process  adapted to the filtration induced by ( )≤ .
We proceed in two steps.
1) We show that policy ∗ is optimal for the agent if and only if, for almost all  ∈ [0  ]:
∗ ∈ arg max   −  ( ) 


(54)

To prove this claim, consider another action policy ( ), adapted to the filtration induced
R
by ( )≤ . Consider the value  =  − 0  ( ) , so that the final utility for the agent
R
under policy  is  ( ). Defining  ≡ 0 [  −  ( ) −  ∗ +  (∗ )] , it can be rewritten
 = 0 +

Z

0



 ( −  ) −

Z



 (∗ )  + 

0

Suppose that (54) is not verified on the set  of times with positive measure. Then, consider
a policy  such that   −  ( )   ∗ −  (∗ ) for  ∈  , and  = ∗ on [0  ] \  . We thus
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have   0. Consider the agent’s utility under policy :
∙ µ
∙ µ
¶¸
¶¸
Z 
Z 
Z 

∗
 ( ) 
=   0 +
 ( −  ) −
 ( )  + 
 =    −
0
0
0
∙ µ
¶¸
Z 
Z 


∗
   −
 ( )  + 
=   0 +
0
0
∙ µ
¶¸
Z 
Z 


∗
   −
 ( ) 
since   0
   0 +
0
0
∙ µ
∙ µ
¶¸
¶¸
Z 
Z 
Z 
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
=
 0 +
  −
   −
 ( ) 
=
 ( ) 
=  




0

0

0

where  ∗ is the agent’s utility under policy ∗ . Hence, as     ∗ , the IC condition is violated.
We conclude that condition (54) is necessary for the contract to satisfy the IC condition.
We next show that condition (54) is also suﬃcient to satisfy the IC condition. Indeed,
∗
consider any adapted policy . Then,  ≤ 0. So, the above reasoning shows that   ≤   .
Policy ∗ is at least as good as any alternative strategy .
2) We show that cost-minimization entails  =  0 (∗ ).
(54) implies  =  0 (∗ ) if ∗ ∈ ( ), and  ≥  0 (∗ ) if ∗ = .
The case where ∗ ∈ ( ) ∀  is straightforward. The IC contract must have the form:
 ( ) = 0 +

Z





0

(∗ ) (

0

−

∗ )

=

Z



 0 (∗ )  + 

0

R
where  = 0 + 0 0 (∗ ) ∗ . Cost minimization entails the lowest possible 0 .
The case where ∗ =  for some  is more complex, since the IC constraint is only an
inequality:  ≥ ∗ ≡  0 (∗ ). We must therefore prove this inequality binds. Consider
=

Z



∗   ,

 =

0

Z



   

0

´
³
R
R
By reshifting  () →   − 0  (∗ )  if necessary, we can assume 0  (∗ )  = 0 to
simplify notation.
We wish to show that a contract  =  +  , with E [ ( +  )] ≥ , has a weakly
greater expected cost than a contract  =  +  , with E [ ( +  )] = . Lemma 7 implies
that E [ ( +  )] ≥ E [ ( +  )], and so
E [ ( +  )] ≤ E [ ( +  )] =  ≤ [ ( +  )] 
Thus,  ≤  . Since  is increasing and concave, −1 is convex and − −1 is concave. We
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can therefore apply Lemma 7 to function − −1 to yield:
£
¤
£
¤
£
¤
E −1 ( +  ) ≤ E −1 ( +  ) ≤ E  −1 ( +  ) 

where the second inequality follows from  ≤  . Therefore, the expected cost of  =  +
is weakly less that of  +  , and so contract  =  +  is cost-minimizing. More explicitly,
R
that is the contract (22) with  =  + 0 0 (∗ ) ∗ .

Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is by induction.
Proof of Proposition 2 for  = 1. We remove time subscripts and let  (b
 ) =  ( (b
))
denote the felicity received by the agent if he announces b and signal  (b
) + b is revealed.
If the agent reports , the principal expects to see signal  +  (). Therefore, if the agent
deviates to report b 6= , he must take action  such that  + = b+ (b
), i.e.  =  (b
 )+ b−.
Hence, the truth-telling constraint is: ∀ ∀b
,

Defining

 (b
 ) −  ( (b
) + b − ) ≤  () −  ( ()) 

(55)

 () ≡  () −  ( ()) 
the truth-telling constraint (55) can be rewritten,
 ( (b
 )) −  ( (b
) + b − ) ≤  () −  (b
) 

(56)

Rewriting this inequality interchanging  and b and combining with the original inequality (56)
yields:
∀ ∀b
 :  ( (b
)) −  ( (b
) + b − ) ≤  () −  (b
) ≤  ( () +  − b) −  ( ()) 

(57)

Consider a point  where  is continuous and take b  . Dividing (57) by  − b  0 and
0
0
b  . Dividing (57) by
taking the limit b ↑  yields 
 () =  ( ()). Next, consider 
0
0
 − b  0 and taking the limit b ↓  yields  () =  ( ()). Hence,
0 () = 0 ( ()) 

(58)

at all points  where  is continuous.
Equation (58) holds only almost everywhere, since we have only assumed that  is almost
everywhere continuous. To complete the proof, we require a regularity argument about  (otherwise  might jump, for instance). We will show that  is absolutely continuous (see, e.g., Rudin
(1987), p.145). Consider a compact subinterval , and  = sup { () +  − b |  b ∈ }, which
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is finite because  is assumed to be bounded in any compact subinterval of . Then, equation
(57) implies:
| () −  (b
 )| ≤ max {| ( (b
)) −  ( (b
) + b − )|   ( () +  − b) −  ( ())} ≤ | − b| (sup  0 ) .

This implies that  is absolutely continuous on . Therefore, by the fundamental theorem
of calculus for almost everywhere diﬀerentiable functions (Rudin (1987), p.148), we have that
R
R
for any  ∗ ,  () =  (∗ ) + ∗ 0 () . From (58),  () =  (∗ ) + ∗  0 ( ()) , i.e.
 () =  ( ()) +

Z



 0 ( ())  + 

(59)

∗

with  =  (∗ ). This concludes the derivation of the contract when  = 1.
“Second-order conditions.” We next show that the contract (59) does implement eﬀort  (),
iﬀ  () +  is nondecreasing: we have verified the first order condition, but we need to show
that (55) holds given the proposed contract, that is, that Φ (b
) ≡  (b
 ) −  ( (b
) + b − ) has
a maximum at .
Proof that  () +  nondecreasing is a suﬃcient condition for the contract to implement
the action. First, we do this when  () is a  1 function. Then,
 ) =  0 (b
) − 0 ( (b
 ) + b − ) (0 (b
) + 1)
Φ0 (b

)) − 0 ( (b
 ) + b − )] (0 (b
 ) + 1)
= [ 0 ( (b

) + 1 ≥ 0 and  is convex, we have Φ0 (b
) ≥ 0 for b ≤  and Φ0 (b
) ≤ 0 for b ≥ . That
As 0 (b
shows that Φ (b
) is maximized at b = .
Second, in the case where  is not necessarily  1 , we approximate the weakly increasing
function  () +  by a series of  1 weakly increasing functions  () + . (It is well-known
that this is easy to do by convolution: take a random variable  with bounded support and
£ ¡
¢
¤ R
 1 density , and define  () +  =    +  +  +  = ( () + )  ( ( − )) 
which increasing in  by the first equality, and  1 by the second.) Consider the associated
contract  →  . We have seen that  ∈ arg max  (b
 ) −  ( (b
) + b − ), so in the limit,
 ∈ arg max  (b
 ) −  ( (b
) + b − ).
Proof that  ()+ nondecreasing is a necessary condition. Call  () =  ()+. Suppose
by contradiction that there are two points    0 such that  ()   (0 ). Those two points
can be taken arbitrarily close (indeed, consider a large , the points  =  + ( 0 − ) ,
 = 0; there must be an  such that  ( )   (+1 ), otherwise we would have  () =
 (0 ) ≤  ( ) =  ( 0 )). As domain A of actions is open, that implies that  () + − 0 ∈ A.
Applying (55) at point  and  0 , we have:
 ( 0 )− ( (0 ) +  0 − ) ≤  ()− ( ()) and  ()− ( () +  − 0 ) ≤  ( 0 )− ( ( 0 )) ⇒
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 ( ( 0 )) −  ( () +  − 0 ) ≤  (0 ) −  () ≤  ( ( 0 ) +  0 − ) −  ( ())
Calling  ≡  ()+−0   ≡  () and  =  (0 )+0 − ()−, this writes  ( + )− () ≤
 ( + ) −  (), and we have a contradiction if  is strictly convex.
Proof that if Proposition 2 holds for  , it holds for  + 1. This part of the proof is as the
proof of Theorem 1 in the main text. At  =  + 1, if the agent reports b +1 , he must take
action  =  (b
 +1 ) + b +1 −  +1 so that the signal  +  +1 is consistent with declaring b +1 .
The IC constraint is therefore:
 +1 ∈ arg max  (1     b +1 ) −  ( (b
 +1 ) + b +1 −  +1 ) −
 +1


X

 (∗ ) 

(60)

=1

Applying the result for  = 1, to induce b +1 =  +1 , the contract must be of the form:
 +1 ) +  (1    ) 
 (1     b +1 ) =  +1 (b

(61)

R 
where  +1 (b
 +1 ) =  ( (b
 +1 ))+ ∗ +1  0 ( ())  and  (1    ) is the “constant” viewed
from period  + 1.
In turn,  (1    ) must be chosen to implement b =  ∀ = 1 , viewed from time 0,
when the agent’s utility is:
" Ã

   (1    ) +  +1 (b
 +1 ) −


X

!#

 ( )

=1



Defining

b () = E [ ( +  +1 (e
 +1 ))] 

(62)

= 1 , with a contract  (1    ), given
the principal’s problem
h ³is to implementPb =  ∀´i

a utility function  
b  (1    ) − =1  ( ) . Applying the result for  , we see that 
must be:

 Z 
X
X
 (1    ) =
 ( ( )) +
 0 ( ())  + ∗
=1

=1

∗

for some constant ∗ . Combining this with (59), the only incentive compatible contract is:
 (1      +1 ) =

 +1
X

 ( ( )) +

=1

 +1 Z
X
=1



∗

 0 ( ())  + ∗ 

The treatment of the second-order conditions ( ( ) +  nondecreasing) is as in the  = 1
case.
Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1. It is easier to work in terms of  () =  0 ( ()), the marginal cost of ef46

fort associated with plan  (). With a slight abuse of notation, define  [] as the expected cost of implementing plan  = { ()}. From Proposition 2 with  = 1,  ( ) =
¢
£ ¡R 
¢¤
¡
R
−1  ◦ ( 0 )−1 ( ()) + 0  ()  +  , where  is the solution of   0  ()  +  =
. Then, the expected cost is:  [] =  [ ( )] 
We first establish that the contract cost  [] is convex in the plan . Consider two plans
1 and 2 , 1 +2 = 1 with 1  2 ∈ [0 1], and the plan  defined by  () = 1 1 ()+2 2 ().
Since  is concave,
∙ µZ
¶¸


 

 ()  + 1 1 + 2 2

0

≥

so the constant  associated with the new plan satisfies  ≤ 1 1 + 2 2 . This shows that the
function  [] is convex in . Since  ◦ (0 )−1 and −1 are convex,  [] ≤ 1  [1 ] + 2  [2 ],
i.e.,  is convex.
Step 2. Since  is convex, we have:
h i
Z   ³
h i
´
  −  [] ≤
 −  () 
 ()

 ¶
µ
¢
¡
¢
¡
¢
¡
 
Furthermore, since 0 is convex, − () ≤ 00   −  () . Defining    = max 0 () ,
h i
¢
R ¡ ¢¡
we have   −  [] ≤     −  () 

C

A Microfoundation for the Principal’s Objective

We oﬀer a microfoundation for the principal’s objective function (26). Suppose that the agent
can take two actions, a “fundamental” action  ∈ ( ] and a manipulative action  ≥ 0.
¡
¢
Firm value is a function of  only, i.e. the benefit function is     . The signal is increasing
£
¤
in both actions:  =  +  + . The agent’s utility is  () −  () +  () , where , 
¡ ¢
are increasing and convex,  (0) = 0, and 0 (0) ≥  0  . The final assumption means that
manipulation is costlier than fundamental eﬀort.
ª
©
We define  =  + and the cost function  () = min    () +  () |  +  =  ,
so that  () =   () for  ∈ ( ] and  () =   () +  ( − ) for  ≥ , which is increasing
¡
¡ ¢ ¢
and convex. Then, firm value can be written  min    e , as in equation (26).
¡
¢
This framework is consistent with rational expectations. Suppose     =  + . After
¡
¢
observing the signal , the market forms its expectation 1 of the firm value     . The
incentive contract described in Proposition 2 implements  ≤ , so the agent will not engage
in manipulation. Therefore, the rational expectations price is 1 =  .
In more technical terms, consider the game in which the agent takes action  and the market
sets price 1 after observing signal . It is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the agent to choose
 () and for the market to set price 1 =  .
47
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